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ABSTRACT

Hyde, Charlotte, N. Ph.D., Purdue University, August 2016. Silent Dissent: The Effect of
Structural Secrecy on Professional Communication at NASA. Major Professor: Michael
Salvo.

This dissertation examines the creation and legitimization of knowledge through an
examination of Dr. Warner von Braun’s weekly communications with his department heads
during the Apollo project. My researched is focused on an archive of memos from the
Marshall Space Flight Center during the 60’s. The memos were referred to as either Monday
Notes or Weekly notes. I use the terms interchangeably, but some scholars differentiate
between the two and refer to the Monday Notes as the communication system that worked
during the Apollo project and the weekly notes as the communication system that broke after
the Apollo project. In my dissertation, I explore the interaction between the MSFC and its
community of Huntsville. Using examples from the Monday Notes, I build a narrative of the
role of racial integration on structural secrecy at MSFC during the Apollo project. Through
this narrative, I consider the impact of structural secrecy on the organization as well as on the
field of technical communication.
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CHAPTER 1. CONSTRUCTING KNOWLEDGE THROUGH THE MUNDANE

Introduction
As a high-profile organization working with risky, unruly technology, NASA often
attracts the attention of scholars seeking to understand how the organization’s
communication practices shaped the culture of the organization and worked to legitimize
knowledge within the space program (Vaughn, Tompkins, Tufte, Dombrowski). To
understand the communicative practices in the organization, researchers are often concerned
with what is concealed within the mundane, i.e. everyday, routine communications, such as
emails, instructions, and PowerPoint (Vaughn, Tompkins, Tufte, Dombrowski). Through
research of various mundane artifacts, scholars have demonstrated evidence of NASA’s drift
into a culture defined by normalization of deviance, structural secrecy, and institutional
forgetfulness, as is shown in particular through the work of NASA scholars Philip K.
Tompkins and Diane Vaughn. In part, Tompkins’ and Vaughn’s studies trace how mundane
artifacts can function as more than just a system of communication to aid collaboration or
impart information; rather, mundane artifacts as Bernadette Longo argues, “can also be seen
as mundane discourse practice[s] working to legitimate some types of knowledge while
marginalizing other possible knowledges” (111). While many NASA studies have
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focused on the communicative artifacts leading up to the Challenger and Columbia
accidents, my study is focused on how communicative practices from the Apollo era may
have shaped and impacted the organization years or decades later. My research is focused on
an archive of memos from the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) that served as part of
the communication process put into place at the center by MSFC’s then director, Dr.
Wernher von Braun.
This study is important because it considers both the silences Tompkins and Vaughn
described as structural secrecy, but my study also looks past the organization itself to the
political concerns surrounding the organization, in particular racial integration and
Kennedy’s promise to get man to the moon in that decade. Somewhat in tandem with
Tompkins and Vaughn, my study looks to the history of both the MSFC and the
organizations placement in that particular historical moment to see how NASA grew into a
cultural of structural secrecy in its later years. The Monday Note archive provides the field of
TPC with a decade long look into an organization dealing with internal and external
pressures and how they constructed knowledge and communicated around these pressures.

Why NASA?
Prior to beginning my PhD program, I worked as a technical writer for a NASA
contractor in Houston, TX. While there, I noticed distinctly different levels of
communication. The level of access to communication depended on the individual’s
particular classification. That is, civil servants had the most access, of course, but even those
occupying contractor roles found their access to communication more or less restricted
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depending on whether they had clearance to work onsite at a NASA center or had clearance
only to work offsite (affording them less access to communication). These levels of access
were further complicated by matters of citizenship, leaving those individuals without
citizenship with the least amount of information. During my PhD studies, I began to
research the organization further, and I learned NASA had originally intended to run more
openly in contrast to organizations that compartmentalize their workers and their access to
information. For example, as Staggers describes in her work on the nuclear bomb project,
compartmentalization was built in as a necessary function of keeping the information on a
strict need to know basis (61-62). Instead, NASA theoretically focused more on open
communication due to the risky nature of space travel. Vaughn and Tompkins argued that
NASA experienced more of a drift away from open communication and into structural
secrecy.
In The Challenger Launch Decision, Vaughn argued that rather than misconduct or
“amoral calculations on the part of NASA managers,” the accident was instead caused by a
normalization of deviance and a culture plagued by structural secrecy, both of which
represent her key findings (38). Vaughn described the normalization of deviance as the slow
but sure drift from what was originally considered “acceptable risk” concerning (in the case of
the Challenger) the erosion of the O-rings. And, she defined structural secrecy as “the way
that patterns of information, organizational structure, processes and transactions, and the
structure of regulatory relations systematically undermine the attempt to know and interpret
situations in all organizations” (238). In his work, Apollo, Challenger, Columbia: The Decline
of the Space Program, Tompkins also pointed to issues of structural secrecy and normalization
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of deviance as contributing factors to both the Challenger and Columbia, and he argued the
organization drifted from what he found to be superior communicative practices used during
the Apollo project.
In the 60’s, Tompkins was invited to MSFC to study the communicative practices,
and he identified von Braun’s Monday Notes as one of the more effective systems in place at
the center (xii). He argued that the design of the Monday Notes worked to combat structural
secrecy during the Apollo project and later changes to the processes of the Monday Notes
contributed to the later disasters. Tompkins described the Monday Notes as a
communication system that was intended to function as an open, inclusive system of
communication between all key members of the team, with one of the key features of the
Monday Notes being discouraging censorship of information both between workgroups and
between the various hierarchical levels (82). As someone with some experience with NASA’s
communicative practices, I was intrigued by the idea of a system of communication that
might have worked against the structural secrecy Vaughn found after the Challenger
accident.
Tompkins’ work is rooted in his first hand experience as a consultant at MSFC
during the Apollo project, but the Monday Notes were thought lost until 2007. When paired
with previous literature, the memos provide new and nuanced views into the organization as
it worked to get humans to the moon while also dealing with the cultural and political
challenges of the 1960’s. The Monday Notes were used to present a variety of information
from mundane concerns to technical specs to elaborate discussions of social justice, such as
racial integration and worker’s rights. Evidenced in these memos is von Braun’s deep and
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constant commitment to document design and clear, effective communication, of interest to
technical communication instructors aiming to help students articulate the value effective
documents have in shaping and legitimizing technical knowledge and organizational culture.
To that end, my research is not just about NASA, as many organizations face
challenges related to the structural secrecy I explore here. As a field, TCP has historically
struggled with issues of power, legitimacy, and identity. In her 2009 article, Rude called on
the field of TCP to consider this as the field’s central question:
How do texts (print, digital, multimedia, visual, verbal) and related communication
practices mediate knowledge values, and action in a variety of social and professional
contexts? (376)
Rude poses this question as “only a starting point” to working toward “identifying what
connects our research and identifies it as technical communication” (376). And, Rude’s 2015
article, Building Identity and Community through Research expands on the question of the
field’s identity as she calls for increased reciprocity between academics and practitioners. In
this article, she argues academics and practitioners are often having two conversations. Of
particular interest for this project, Rude writes, “We have often talked about barriers to the
kind of empirical research that might benefit practitioners, especially access to sites, where
data may be confidential” (377). Because the Monday Notes provide a long-range view into
a particular work group, the notes allow a workplace study that is unaffected by the barriers
we typically face such as non-disclosure agreements. Acknowledging that texts only give us
part of the story, the notes when combined with previous research begin to show a fuller
narrative. So while we can learn much from the texts of the notes themselves, as Rude calls
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for, the Monday Notes become an important and expansive addition to the field when
paired with previous literature on the space program, previous literature on the culture
during the Apollo project, and the parallel histories of the field of TCP.

Power and Legitimacy
I began this project with an eye toward structural secrecy as defined by Vaughn above,
and as I progressed I found evidence of structural secrecy. I also found points of silence that
don’t necessarily fall into Vaughn’s definition of structural secrecy, but are nevertheless
notable. In particular, the notes revealed a sudden and somewhat jarring silence surrounding
racial integration and the Apollo 1 fire. I focused my research at the intersection of structural
secrecy and its related silences because it’s in these silences the power and legitimacy of
technical communication and its mundane documents is revealed. As a field, TPC has
struggled to assert its power, legitimacy, and even visibility, and in some ways, my project
seeks to address some of the ongoing legitimacy issues within the field. As I describe further
in Chapter 3, one of the first memos that stood out to me as valuable to the field of TPC
involved evidence of von Braun’s insistence on clear, concise, and consistent writing. As a
TPC educator, von Braun’s insistence on clarity allows me to demonstrate the legitimacy of
the field both to my non-majors (students from engineering, management, etc.) as well as to
my TPC majors. Most people probably wouldn’t consider von Braun a technical
communicator, but he valued clear communication and he was concerned with clear and
useful acronyms, descriptive headings, and document design. In this small way, the archive
contributes to addressing small parts of the legitimacy debate and responding partially to
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Rude’s posed question. In a larger way, the archive (and its silences) contribute to both our
understanding of how power and legitimacy plays out in texts and to our legitimacy as a field.
In her recent article, The Technical Communicator as Advocate, Integrating a Social Justice
Approach in Technical Communication Jones wrote, “The field of technical communication,
‘emerged in industrial contexts,’ and these historical roots, which are embedded in these
industrial practices, beliefs, and ideals of the early 20th century do not naturally have a focus
on social justice and human rights” (3). The Monday Notes archive in many ways
demonstrates the “industrial practices, beliefs, and ideals” Jones refers to, and as such the
expansiveness of the archive mirrors our own history as a field.
In Addressing the Incommensurable: A Research-Based Perspective for Considering Issues
of Power and Legitimacy in the Field, St. Amant and Meloncon argued, “we tend to be
marginalized in the discussions of caregiving in favor of more legitimate parties—such as
physicians, nurses, and other healthcare professionals” (5). While this may be true to an
extent, gaining legitimacy with partners outside the field helps TPC gain legitimacy as a field.
That is, when von Braun demonstrates the importance of clear communication and
document design, he’s demonstrating to his team that he valued those elements in the notes.
But, in a larger sense, the silences demonstrate the humanistic side of TPC, which moves
beyond the text and beyond a small group of individuals and considers context more
holistically. As Miller argued,
We can teach technical or scientific writing, not as a set of skills; it becomes a kind of
enculturation. We can teach technical or scientific writing, not as a set of techniques
for accommodating slippery words to intractable things, but as an understanding of
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how to belong to a community. To write, to engage in any communication, is to
participate in a community; to write well is to understand the conditions of one’s
own participation—the concepts, values, traditions, and style which permit
identification with that community and determine the success or failure of
communication.” (54)
The silences in the Monday Notes (both structural and otherwise) provide an opportunity
for the field of TPC to demonstrate legitimacy beyond the surface concerns of document
design and style. Indeed, the notes show how this one particular group was operating as a
community, as well as how they operated within their larger community of NASA as an
organization, military and contractor partners, and the community of Huntsville. It is within
the silences that we see what is left out, who was included, and who was not. Access to a large
archive of documents, allows us to identify and teach how to learn to identify these silences.
Pairing the archive with the previous literature and narratives surrounding it allow us to
build a fuller picture of the history that may have led to later disasters (in the case of NASA
in particular), and allow us to articulate our legitimacy as a field to our partners. Although
the Monday Notes archive is 50 years old, the need to identify and teach students to identify
internal political struggles continues to be a priority for the field (Tebeaux, 36). The silences
in the Monday Notes reveal many of the internal political struggles of von Braun’s group at
MSFC in particular and of NASA in general.
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Project Overview
My research is informed by von Braun’s Monday Notes in combination with prior
research and descriptions of the cultural imperative at MSFC during the Apollo project. The
Monday Notes archive begins early in the Apollo project in 1961. In 1967 following an
invitation from von Braun to analyze the communicative practices at MSFC, organizational
scholar Phillip K. Tompkins identified the Monday Notes as one of the more effective means
of communication at MSFC (80). Decades later, after the Columbia accident, Tompkins
returned to MSFC to learn the memos had changed to emails, and with that, according to
Tompkins, the Monday Notes lost their key benefits, including the direct back-and-forth
feedback with the director (117). Tompkins points to the transformation of the notes as a
sign of a “fairly serious degree of organizational forgetting over the years, as well as an erosion
of strength in some of MSFC’s more traditional communicative practices” (117). To that
end, my study seeks to examine key sections of the Monday Notes in conjunction with
communicative practices surrounding the later disasters to consider the legacy the notes may
have had on later communicative practices within the organization. In many ways, NASA’s
continued struggles with communication mirror the field of TCP’s struggles with power and
legitimacy. St. Amant and Meloncon wrote,
“to many outside the field, the notion of technical in TPC tends to bring with it
assumptions of the current or the future. After all, technical—as connected to
technology—is a matter of the here and now, right? Yet, as many of us know, it is
often essential to turn to the past to understand the present. Similarly, it is essential
to understand both the past and the present to plan effectively of the future. Such
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factors are central to considering how we study the history of the field. They are also
central to our understanding of how aspects of technology, society, economics, and
so on have shaped, currently affect, and could continue to guide practices in the field.”
(12)
NASA tends to echo it’s own struggles, as our literature tends to echo ours. Tompkins’ first
person narrative of the events at MSFC during Apollo and with the Monday Notes
themselves are both significant pieces for my study, particularly because NASA has continued
to be accused of organizational forgetfulness.
The purpose of my dissertation is to locate and illuminate the paths and places where
communication becomes buried by culture, power, and language through structural secrecy
among workgroups, which led to a tangle of power, “legitimate” knowledge, and misused or
misunderstood communication practices. The questions I will explore include:
What factors led to this culture of structural secrecy? NASA scholars, such as
Tompkins, specifically point to technologies such as email as having been
contributing factors. But, can we find evidence of structural secrecy in the Apollo era?
How did that structural secrecy evolve into the structural secrecy Vaughn argues
caused the Challenger disaster? And, later caused the Columbia accident? What
voices were lost.

Chapter Overviews
Research from the 1960s into the culture at MSFC suggests that, while von Braun’s
team was working to inoculate their group from structural secrecy, factors such as separation
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of status, organizational identification, and deference to hierarchy (over expertise) created
persistent challenges that affected how MSFC insiders interacted with those outside of the
MSFC. Chapter 2 more fully describes the archive and how I approached the Monday
Notes. Chapter 3 describes the role structural secrecy played in the later disasters and how
both the origins of NASA as an organization and the communicative practices of the
Monday Notes set the stage for structural secrecy to become rooted in the organization.
Chapter 4 addresses the places where silence, while perhaps not deliberate, moves beyond the
definition of structural secrecy. In particular, chapter 4 addresses the silences surrounding
civil rights and the Apollo 1 fire, demonstrating the impact those outside of von Braun’s
group had on the operations at MSFC. When paired with prior research into the
organization, both research from later decades and the research during the Apollo project, a
narrative begins to emerge from the Monday Notes that demonstrates key areas where
structural secrecy was already embedded within the organization. In addition to the
dynamics inside the center, the participants at MSFC would also have been impacted by the
cultural and political imperatives that surrounded the center and in some ways were unique
to Huntsville at the time.
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CHAPTER 2. METHODS: STRUCTURAL SECRECY IN PRACTICE

The Monday Notes archive consists of approximately 15,000 memos and notes
spanning from the early 60’s until the early 70’s (History, “Introduction to Wernher von
Braun’s Weekly Notes”). The notes contain the communications between von Braun and
the key members of the team. MSFC historian Mike Wright scanned the Monday Notes to
create digital copies, but the physical notes are still kept at the Southeastern District Office of
the National Archives in Morrow, GA (History, “Introduction to Wernher von Braun’s
Weekly Notes”). Of the approximately 15,000 weekly notes in the archive, my project
looked at the 9,220 pages of notes that were digitally available as of May 2016. Due to the
physical nature and age of the Monday Notes, they are sometimes difficult to read and resist
any methods to sort via electronic means. The archive is conversational and gives technical
writers insight into how this group engaged with both the technical information and with
each other. Because of the depth and breath of the Monday Note archive, we can see not
only the history of this particular group at NASA, but the archive also echoes the history of
the field of TPC. In Spurious Coin, Longo posed the question,
“Why does technical writing work to legitimate scientific knowledge in the 20thcentury United States while other kinds of knowledge are marginalized or silent? The
answers we find to this question will retell stories of struggles and tensions within our
culture and within historic relations of knowledge and power. The histories we write
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in answer to this question will help us understand why we, as technical and
professional communicators, value some types of knowledge, practice some types of
communication, teach students some things and not other. This histories will help us
understand how we arrived at our currents situation, where we can go from here, and
how we can get there.” (163)
To consider the legacy the notes may have had on later communicative practices within the
organization, I have examined key sections of the Monday Notes in conjunction with
selected communications, first hand accounts, and literature that followed the later disasters.
As I began my initial examination of the Monday Notes, I wanted to work toward a
holistic view of the Notes and allow the story (or stories) to emerge through the notes
themselves. At the same time, I wanted to take steps to ensure my examination of the notes
wasn’t overly influenced by my own experience with NASA as an organization or by my own
research and academic interests. To that end, I relied on the principles Katherine E. Tirabassi
lays out in her chapter “Journeying into the Archives: Exploring the Pragmatics of Archival
Research” from Working in the Archives: Practical Research Methods for Rhetoric and
Composition. In this chapter, Tirabassi suggests considering principles of selectivity, crossreferencing, categorization, and closure. Below, I describe my approach to these archives and
my attempt to bring a coherent narrative out of a scattered collection of communications.

Principles of Selectivity
Tirabassi observed that we should “be selective in developing a usable source” (172).
Even within individual archives, such as the Monday Notes, I have found many elements
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that could be relevant and many that were not directly relevant to the emergent narrative.
Because the Monday Notes are so expansive, the principles of selectivity became critically
important for my project. Tirabassi cautions that “Including all of the materials from a
donor into a given collection has the potential to create an archive that is too cumbersome
for researchers and that could overwhelm the physical space of the archive” (172). To date,
the Monday Notes archive is in its raw form, and it’s presented in its chronological order.
Keeping this in mind, I focused on the elements that emerged that allowed me to address my
initial research questions, but I also remained open to the unexpected stories and themes as
they emerged. As I will describe in this chapter, my key areas came to be centered on the
beginning of the archive (the meta-notes) and the evidence of contractor and military
tensions, both of which echo NASA’s later challenges with structural secrecy. In addition, I
focused on the discussions about racial integration and worker’s rights and the attention to
audience evidenced in the time period immediately following the Apollo 1 accident, both of
which add to the narrative of a silence that was contrary to the group’s stated desire for open
communication. These specific narrative threads contribute to articulating what I see as the
origins of structural secrecy within NASA, but these threads also articulate how the
surrounding cultural and political imperatives from those outside the organizations impacted
the flow of communication on the inside. As I discuss further in Chapters 3 and 4, the
combination of the organization’s set up and culture led to a separation of status, deference
to hierarchy over expertise and an organizational identification that led to territorial
complications. These complications were further exacerbated by the political climate of the
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period, including Kennedy’s push for the moon and racial tensions in the U.S. as well as
Huntsville.

Principle of Cross Referencing
Tirabassi noted “artifacts are acontextual—with no clear author and, at times, just a
vague temporal marker” (172). I found the Monday Notes were often missing context and
even names of the specific participants (History, “Introduction to Wernher von Braun’s
Weekly Notes). The notion of “author” occasionally becomes muddled in the Monday
Notes, and von Braun himself wrote a very small percentage of the notes. I turned to
Foucault’s essay “What is an Author” to think about addressing the missing or muddled
author in the Monday Notes:
The coming into being of the notion of “author” constituted the privileged moment
of individualization in the history of ideas, knowledge, literature, philosophy, and the
sciences. Even today, when we reconstruct the history of a concept, literary genre, or
school of philosophy, such categories seem relatively week, secondary, and
superimposed scansions in comparison with the sold and fundamental unit of the
author and the work.” (The Foucault Reader, 101)
The Monday Notes encompass many authors, and as such, I viewed them, for the purposes
of this project, as one unit, but it’s important to note that they were not one unit. Each of
the authors was distinct and concerned with their specific area. As such, throughout the
Monday Notes, a scholar would be able to follow a specific thread, for example a technical
thread, and HR thread, a public relations thread, etc.
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To further complicate matters, the notes often have typewritten dates crossed out
and corrected with new, handwritten dates. The Monday Notes varied in their levels of
formality. As the examples in chapters 3 and 4 show, sometimes they were very formal and
resemble a modern day memo. Other times, they are more informal. The Monday Notes
were written on a typewriter, which was a limitation of technology Ward also discussed in
his work on the Nazi SS memos. He points to the limitation of the technology as a way to
assess the formality and seriousness of a given document:
Those who have never created a document on a typewriter, but who have always
enjoyed the convenience of editing their copy on a word processor, cannot
understand the painstaking difficulty and repeated attempts required to produce such
a document on a typewriter—and further on a manual typewriter (with, of course,
no self-correcting capability). (124)
Ward argues the difficulty of getting a document just right using a typewriter spoke to both
the seriousness and formality of the document. Shifting levels of formality and seriousness
are also evidenced in the Monday Notes. The participants in the Monday Notes also often
demonstrated the limitations of the typewriter when they crossed out names or dates and
wrote in corrections rather than retype the whole memo. At other times, the memos were
written with the more painstaking attention Ward discusses. Some were signed by von Braun,
suggesting higher levels of attention to design likely carried a higher level of authority.
To help mitigate some of the blanks and missing threads, I paired my examination of
the Monday Notes with notable NASA scholars, including Vaughn and Tompkins as well as
with notable von Braun biographer Michael Nuefeld to begin to bring out the narrative from
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the archives and help attend to the “document’s rhetorical situation—the author (when
knowable), the intended audience, and the purpose of the document” (Tirabassi, 173).
While the work of Vaughn, Tompkins, and Neufeld helped guide my understanding of the
inner workings of NASA and von Braun’s impact as the Director of MSFC, I also turned to
Monique Laney’s historical account German Rocketeers in the Heart of Dixie: Making Sense of
the Nazi Past During the Civil Right’s Era to strengthen the triangulation between the
Monday Notes, the accounts of previous scholars, and the cultural and political imperatives
of the 60’s in general and Huntsville and MSFC in particular.

Principles of Categorization
Tirabassi advises those working with archives to “Develop as many classification
terms and key questions as possible in order to make the search more fruitful (175).” As I
moved through the archive, many categories began to emerge, so I chose to focus this project
on the categories that tended to speak to structural secrecy, normalization of deviance, and
identification that all fed into the significance of these themes to the later organizational
culture and led to the echoes heard after the Challenger and Columbia accidents. These
particular themes paired with the previous scholarship and began to create a narrative of the
culture driving this small group of NASA engineers. The following describes the emergent
narratives I came to focus on as I worked through the archive:
1. Meta-notes
During the early years of the archive, von Braun and his team worked through
the function and purpose of the notes within the notes themselves. As I will
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discuss in more detail in Chapter 3, the meta-notes interested me because they
showed a glimpse into the thought process of this particular team. The metanotes also demonstrate von Braun’s management style: conflict and redundancy.
Tompkins noted from his time at Marshall, “Von Braun had such a positive
attitude toward conflict and sought to encourage it; perhaps he had even
engineered the means to impress it into the very structure of the organization”
(85). In these initial meta-notes, von Braun’s preference for conflict (and
sometimes contradiction) began to emerge, as do initial traces of possible
structural secrecy.

2. Partner tensions
Initially, I was interested in learning about the tensions between those working
at MSFC and the contractors they worked with. But, while reading the archive
and previous literature, it became apparent that von Braun was territorial about
his project in many ways, including conflict with military and political partners.
Nuefeld characterized von Braun’s desire to keep the technical talent in house
and tendency to become territorial about Marshall’s role in the space program:
“Von Braun’s fundamental problem was the mentality that he brought from his
record of success: a go-it-alone attitude and a feeling of superiority derived
from his thirty years of groundbreaking technological accomplishments with an
arsenal organization that had enough capability to do most of the job itself”
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(384). The Monday Notes themselves contain many examples of von Braun’s
territorialism and go-it-alone attitude.

3. Racial integration
Because of von Braun’s past as an SS officer, literature and biographies of von
Braun tend to follow a narrative of either “hero” or “villain,” so any discussion
of von Braun would be incomplete without a consideration of his Nazi past
and how that might have played into his career with NASA. In addition to von
Braun, Project Paperclip brought an influx of recently immigrated Germans to
the Huntsville area. Laney argued, “While the national level is important for
understanding the context of memories of a war, Huntsville had its own
contentious past to grapple with” (loc 284). “The first German Families arrived
when Jim Crow laws were still a mainstay of southern culture, with its legacy of
slavery and a growing civil rights movement on the horizon” (loc 284). When
paired with the narrative of Nazi immigration, the struggles of Huntsville as a
community provides a fuller picture of the attitudes surrounding the MSFC.

4. Audience awareness
Because the Monday Notes span almost a decade, the archive gives technical
communicators the opportunity to trace how this organization attended to
audience both the audience of those in the group and, after Apollo 1, an
audience of those outside the group. In her text, Vaughn provides a brief
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discussion of the politics of blame and the importance of attention to hindsight
bias:
Invariably, the politics of blame directs our attention to certain individuals
and not others when organizations have failures. Invariably, the accepted
explanation is some form of “operator error,” isolating in the media spotlight
someone responsible for the hands-on work: the captain of the ship, a
political functionary, a technician, or middle-level managers. (392-393)
The Monday Notes provide evidence that von Braun and his team began the notes
with an internal audience in mind but were also aware of the larger, outside audience.
Vaughn argued hindsight bias feeds into the politics of blame, writing “to a great extent, we
are unwitting participants because without extraordinary expenditure of time and energy we
cannot get beyond appearances. But we are also complicitious for we bring to our
interpretation of public failures a wish to blame, a penchant for psychological explanations,
and inability to identify the structural and cultural causes, and a need for a straightforward,
simple answer that can be quickly grasped” (393). Over the decade, the attention to audience
shifted from that of an internal audience to that of an external audience.
Tirabassi argues, “because the archival record is incomplete, historical research is often
messy, unwieldy, unexpected, and ultimately is always constructed by the historian’s
selections, omissions, and biases” (175). Here, Tirabassi is discussing the ways archivists
collect and organize archives, but the Monday Notes have not, as of this writing, been
organized into anything other than a strict chronological order. My categorizations, then,
emerged from the themes that began presenting themselves during my examination of the
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archive as a whole. I have done my best to identify the categories that create a coherent
narrative of how the initial structure, organization, and cultural and political imperatives of
the era impacted the organization’s tendency toward structural secrecy.

Principles of Closure
Tirabassi’s Principle of Closure became another critical element of my examination
of this particular archive. The Monday Notes contain many, many themes, including the
sharing of technical specs and building of technical knowledge though these weekly memos.
For the purposes of this project, my research focused on the building of the notes, the
emerging themes of power and exclusion (and sometimes inclusion), and the attention to
audience this group demonstrated in varying ways throughout this decade. Future projects
will explore the technical specs and knowledge more closely.
My initial examination of the Monday Notes involved reading my way through the
entire decade of notes and pulling out the themes as they emerged. I brought Tirabassi’s
principles with me into the archive, but I proceeded cautiously as Ramsey et al. caution in
the introduction to Working in the Archives: “Archival research, even when the researcher is
prepared with a methods toolbox is never a rigid process, nor should it be. Similar to the
composing process itself, archival research is often recursive—subject to starts and stops,
revisions and reworking, through out the lifetime of a project” (5). Many scholars “readily
admit the impossibility of getting the story exactly right, let alone recovering an objective
truth” according to Cheryl Glen and Jessica Enoch in their work Invigorating Historiographic
Practices in Rhetoric and Composition Studies (11). Indeed the field of Technical
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Communication often fights against a notion of what is “true” looking instead to find the
value effective documents have in shaping and legitimizing technical knowledge and
organizational culture.
My initial interest in the Monday Note archives centered on how the Monday notes
evidenced the structural secrecy as found by both Vaughn and Tompkins in their studies. I
was specifically interested in learning if the Monday Notes indeed guarded the organization
against structural secrecy, as described by Tompkins, or if the phenomenon of structural
secrecy was already evident in the narrative of the Monday Notes. Because the Monday
Notes were thought lost until 2007, the physical notes and digital scans provide a
compliment to Tompkins’ first person narrative of his time at the Marshall Space Flight
Center During the 60’s. The Monday Notes themselves are often hard and sometimes
impossible to read. They mostly consist of scans of typed memos. Many of the memos follow
a conventional memo format, but some do not and instead were typed on smaller papers
without using any of the conventions of the genre of memo. Von Braun would write on the
memos and send them back. As such the memos include a lot of handwritten marginalia,
which while often fairly easy to decipher, can sometimes be difficult to impossible. To
address the issue of the large, unwieldy archive with sometimes hard to read documents, I
worked my way through and pulled screenshots of the relevant entries. As I will discuss in
the following chapter, I was sometimes able to follow a thread through days or weeks of the
memos, and sometimes I would lose the thread either because pages were missing or the
involved parties stopped writing about the issue. But, through the Monday Notes, I often
began to see the personalities of the participants come through, particularly von Braun’s
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personality. The “hero” narrative that often describes von Braun is evident in his notes. He
often was directive and he was clearly the leader of the group, but he also often demonstrated
caring and allowed his team to introduce humor into their day. The examples included in
Chapters 3 and 4 were chosen because they are the ones I felt best represented the overall
emerging narrative of the notes (as least as the narrative pertains to the structural secrecy and
silence).

Locating the Archive within Political, Social, and Institutional Histories
As I was approaching the archive, I worked to remain mindful that the archive and
my research exist in two sometimes competing points during history. Tompkins description
of the Monday Notes came from his first-hand account and from interviews with
participants as they were still creating the archive. Tompkins found the notes very popular
among the participants and he noted that they, in a sense, worked to ward off structural
secrecy. So, on one hand, I was interested in what the Monday Notes could tell us about the
past, but on the other hand, I was also interested in what the Monday Notes can tell us
about how organizations function in the present and how structural secrecy can or might
lead to challenges within organizations. To that end, I approached the Monday Notes from
both the historical period they lived in and as I see them affecting the organization today.
Through this investigation, I began working toward Tirabassi’s Principle of Cross References.
That is, what experiences do I bring to this research? How does Tompkins’ first-hand
account corroborate or complicate the issues of structural secrecy later found in the
organization? How did the formation of the organization itself (prior to the Monday Notes)
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possibly contribute to the organization’s later tendency to drift into structural secrecy? From
its creation, NASA seems to have already been on a collision course with structural secrecy
regardless of how well the Monday Notes aided specific collaborators at MSFC during the
60’s. Tompkins description of NASA’s initial organization leads to the possibility that the
Monday Notes may have worked well internally at the Marshall Center, they may not have
contributed effectively to the organization as a whole. So, I also wanted to see how the
Monday Notes contributed to later communications within the organization.
NASA’s initial organization combined with communications that scholars have
studied extensively over the years, demonstrate that NASA may have already been struggling
with an atmosphere of structural secrecy. But, Tompkins found the Monday Notes to
provide at least some insurance against this drift (83). With that in mind, I approached the
archive with his narrative, along with my own and that of other notable NASA and technical
communication scholars. Researchers often find distancing themselves and finding the “truth”
in an archive or situation difficult. While I mostly approached the Monday Notes archive
looking for evidence of structural secrecy, I often find it hard to separate the concept of
structural secrecy from that of institutional forgetfulness. Both Vaughn and Tompkins found
structural secrecy to be at least partially to blame for the later disasters, and in the Columbia
Accident Review Board, as Sally Ride said, “There seems to be a bit of an echo in here.”
Would the archive show evidence of a reverse echo? (Dunbar).
Again, Von Braun is often portrayed as either hero or villain, and most literature
leans one way or another. Some view him as a hero who was a great leader and organizer who
led the way for America to send (wo)man to the moon. While others question the ethics of
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bringing a fairly high-ranking Nazi, who previously used concentration camp labor to build
the V2 rockets, to America to take a high-ranking position with the government. As such,
von Braun himself introduced a lot of complexity and nuance into a situation already
complex and nuanced. After reading several competing theories and biographies, I came to
the conclusion that von Braun was good at adapting to his environment. I’m not sure he ever
cared much about politics; instead he just wanted to build his rockets. It is impossible for any
of us to truly know his motives or ethical stance, which is to be expected. Thus, my findings
as presented in the next chapters narrate where the organization began to demonstrate
vulnerability to structural secrecy as evidenced through the Monday Notes in combination
with the literature and previous research on both von Braun and his team at MSFC during
the Apollo project.
Von Braun and his team used the Monday Notes to tackle a variety of mundane dayto-day issues as well as technical specs and larger political and cultural concerns. Many of the
specific threads that run through the Monday Notes continue for months or even years. The
variety of concerns and sheer size of the Monday Notes archives opens the door for
researchers to follow a number of lines of inquiry. Of course, the Monday Notes also
represent only part of the story, that of a small group of participants at one NASA center.
Left out of the archive are the voices of those who interacted with von Braun and his team:
the contractors, the military, the local community, the larger NASA community, the general
public, etc. Throughout this research project, I worked to bring in some of these voices
through complimentary texts that address the same period and place if not the actual archive
or day-to-day activities at the Marshall Space Flight Center. Getting an accurate sense of the
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climate and the man more than 50 years later is, of course, difficult, and von Braun, in
particular, proved hard to pin down.
In Chapters 3 and 4, I present my findings and analysis in two parts. Chapter 3
considers the Monday Notes in conjunction with Vaughn’s and Tompkins’ more traditional
definition of structural secrecy as an invisible (and unintended) barrier between workgroups.
In Chapter 3, I provide a fuller definition of structural secrecy as well as an investigation into
how the origins of the organization and evidence in the Monday Notes suggests structural
secrecy was already beginning to take root in the 60’s. In Chapter 4, I investigate the silences
surrounding racial integration and the Apollo 1 fire. While the silences discussed in Chapter
4 might not have been consciously deliberate, they are notable points of silence that go
beyond structural secrecy and have an impact on communication inside and outside
organizations.
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CHAPTER 3: CULTURAL IDENTITY AND A NETWORK OF SECRECY

Tompkins described the Monday Notes functioning as an institutional conduit to
von Braun, and in many ways, the Monday Notes functioned as Tompkins described, but in
other ways, the notes point to alternative possibilities—alternative experiences of the notes.
These may have been the first stirrings, the first evidence of structural secrecy. The notes also
show evidence of silences that begin to move outside of Vaughn’s definition of structural
secrecy, which I will present in Chapter 4. But, the notes also show a team committed to the
project and the organization. In his text, Apollo, Challenger, and Columbia, Tompkins argues
that the design of the Monday Notes worked to combat and insure MSFC against structural
secrecy during the Apollo project and that changes to the process of the Monday Notes
contributed to the later struggles with structural secrecy and contributed to the Challenger
and Columbia disasters (83). In order to demonstrate the similarities and differences in
NASA as an organization between the Apollo project and the later disasters, I begin here by
describing the later disasters and previous literature surrounding NASA’s origins along with
the cultural imperatives that combined with the communication breakdowns to create a
system that was plagued with structural secrecy. I find it difficult to separate the concept of
structural secrecy from those of deference to hierarchy, separation of status, and organization
identification, so for the purposes of this project and, in particular, this chapter, I use
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structural secrecy as the umbrella term with deference to hierarchy, separation of status, and
organizational identification feeding into the definition of structural secrecy.

Echoes of Challenger and Columbia
In order to fully appreciate the way structural secrecy might have operated at MSFC
during the space program, here I will briefly describe how structural secrecy impacted later
projects. In Vaughn’s tracing of the eve of the Challenger launch, she demonstrates how the
workgroups were somewhat “fitfully negotiated and constructed” as the participants went in
search of the “truth,” a truth distinct from the “larger historical, cultural, and social
discourses” (335). For NASA managers, what counted as “truth” the night of the Challenger
launch was quantitative data. While the traditional accounts of the Challenger disaster hold
that the managers’ decisions that night involved “rule violations,” upon analysis, they seem
instead to have been “rule-based” (Vaughn, 335). That is the managers “abided by all
internal NASA rules and norms for flight-readiness assessments” (Vaughn, 335). But, as
married to their data as NASA managers may have been, the previous account of the night
before the launch does not get us any closer to the “truth” of the situation. Instead, the
analysis of their attention to ‘strictly technical’ information conceals their other two cultural
imperatives: bureaucratic and political accountability.
Not everyone was so sure the launch was safe however; some engineers from Thiokol
did not feel comfortable with a launch decision. According to Vaughn, Thiokol engineers
knew their position was not based on solid data. They, themselves, said “their argument was
‘subjective,’ ‘inconclusive,’ ‘qualitative,’ ‘intuitively correct,’ and based on engineering ‘feel’”
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(Vaughn, 355). One such engineer, Roger Boisjoly said, “I knew I couldn’t quantify it. I had
no data to quantify it, but I did say I knew it was away from goodness [sic] in the current
data base” (Vaughn, 355). Vaughn writes that Boisjoly’s argument would have been seen by
NASA managers as an “emotional argument” (Vaughn, 355). But, “’Real’ technology
conformed to the norms of quantitative, scientific, positivism” (Vaughn, 355). NASA’s
modern culture seemed deeply ingrained. If the argument wasn’t fitting the ‘strictly technical’
definition, those in power couldn’t really hear it. That is, they couldn’t see the “truth” within
the constraints of their organizational culture. Characterizing Boisjoly’s accounts as
“emotional” may lead some to see Boisjoly (and others) as repressed by those in power. The
NASA managers did not want to listen to and, thereby simply discounted “subjective,
intuitive” arguments. But, the organization was too complex for such a simple answer.
According to Vaughn, “Vocal opposition by engineers was not as strong at the time as it
seemed in retrospect” (356), not because it wasn’t present, but because it was structurally
silenced. In addition, Vaughn argues, “Official organizational practices, including problem
resolution and reporting rules that reduced the amount of information going to the top,
operated to systematically censor what was relayed upward on the eve of the launch”
(Vaughn, 346).
But, this structural silence was not an intentional act of repression of the engineer’s
views; rather, it was due to physical distance and the participants’ hierarchical positions
(Vaughn, 357). In this case, defining power as “negative” or “repressive” falls into the
definition of power Foucault argues is a “wholly negative, narrow, skeletal conception of
power” (The Foucault Reader, 61). NASA theoretically had an open-forum, “freedom of
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speech” culture, but in practice, managers and engineers defaulted to organizational norms
(Vaughn, 369). That is, once an engineer had said his or her piece, “absent new data or
insights, they could say no more. They knew their place” (Vaughn, 369). This appears to
ride the line between Foucault’s disciplinary society and Deleuze’s control society. According
to Deleuze, “The disciplinary societies have two poles: the signature that designates the
individual, and the number or administrative numeration that indicates his or her position
within a mass” (5). On the eve of the Challenger, several engineers balked at launching as
individuals, but once they said their piece, they joined the mass. On the other hand,
Deleuze’s control society also shows up in this analysis because part of the reason the
engineers stop participating in the conversation was because they had no new data and had
become “dividuals” (Deleuze, 5). NASA’s already ingrained discourse “rules” ruled the day,
so to speak. Lyotard argues this has to be the case: “So you see that all language games have
rules, and these rules deal with the functioning of the various pragmatic positions. No one
may put herself or himself there; no one may be in authority” (72). But, in a sense,
everyone had at least some authority, and as Vaughn writes, “The post tragedy imagery of
solitary opposition of managers versus engineers is not borne out; most participants were
both managers and engineers” (334).
In addition to the bureaucratic accountability, NASA’s political accountability, that
began in the 1970’s, had become institutionalized, “having a subtle, insidious effect” the eve
of the launch (Vaughn, 372). Marshall’s managers brought “harsh criticism” to the Thiokol
managers, according to Vaughn (375). Harsh criticism wasn’t unusual in NASA’s culture
and was possibly, in part a “motivating force” as described in Deleuze’s Postscript on the
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Societies of Control: “The corporation constantly presents the brashest rivalry as a healthy
form of emulation, an excellent motivational force that opposes individuals against one
another and runs through each, dividing each within” (Deleuze, 5). Marshall’s Larry Wear,
describing the culture of the Flight Readiness Review commented: “But, you’ve got to be
able to stand the heat, so to speak, based on what you have said,” and “Boisjoly confirmed
that harsh criticism by Level III management was the norm” (Vaughn, 341, 342). The
engineers knew they always had to be on their toes and be ready to state their case. In a sense,
they operated in a “state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic
functioning of power” (The Foucault Reader, 198). But, in the end, “consensus was absent,
not all engineers shared the view represented by Boisjoly” (Vaughn, 355).
The lack of consensus is not surprising, as Lyotard argues in his chapter “The
Impossible Consensus.” However, in the aftermath of the disaster, NASA perhaps tried to
create an illusion of consensus. According to Vaughn, “When Thiokol engineers were chosen
to testify before the Presidential Commission and the House Committee, those who held
views that differed from Boisjoly were not called. Thus one point of view was presented, and
an image of engineering consensus was created” (334). This serves to further criticism of
NASA, but not necessarily bring us closer to the truth of what went wrong. Rather, this type
of evidence only gives us the basis on which to form more opinions, as Lyotard argues, “We
are always in judgments of opinion and not in judgments of truth” (28). Vaughn set out to
determine if managers or engineers at NASA had acted amorally, but Lyotard would argue
that is not possible because, at the end of the day, no one was dealing with the “truth:”
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If one limits oneself to the notion of opinion or that of representation, of phantasma
in other words, then it seems to me that the combination is impossible. In such a
hypothesis, there is no morality, or, if one introduces morality, it risks being but a
morality by convention, where, as Pascal rightly says, what just is that which has been
judged as just and upon which everyone agrees. And it is true that, under those
conditions, there is no possible politics. There is only consensus. But we know what
that means: the manufacture of a subject that is authorized to say “we.” (Lyotard, 81)
Ward paints a similar picture of how the individual versus the larger group in his analysis of
management science, writing,
Since the discipline of ‘management science” emerged a century ago, scholars in
organization studies have historically hewed to a functionalist or positivist ontology
(Corman 2005). In this view, ‘organizations’ are ontologically distinct entities whose
behaviors are driven not by individual mindsets but by the constant quest to
maximize efficiency and productivity. Thus, from observations of organizational
behaviors can causal theories be derived and predictions made ‘with the
consciousness of the actors being superfluous,’ since decision makers are impelled ‘to
choose the option that best fits the situation and produces the best outcomes. (2)
The concept of individual versus group agency played out over and over at NASA during the
Challenger and Columbia accidents, and both Tompkins and Vaughn blamed this, in part,
on the medium of the message. That is, they point to the evolution of the memos or
Monday Notes to that of quicker, less formal email. According to Tompkins and Vaughn,
the shift to email created a “blizzard of paperwork” mean to increase access to information,
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but often, in practice, this meant information was lost or buried. Their arguments about
what impact of the “blizzard of paperwork” had on structural secrecy are valid, but for this
project, I was more interested in working through how the initial set up of the organization
led to the believe systems that later worked to create structural secrecy. Working instead to
navigate the tensions between clear and effective communication and the power structures
and ethics that surround communication is central to this research, and approaching the
archive with an eye toward these power structures allows us to to address Slack et al’s
argument that “Naivete about how organizations work articulates well to the myth of the
technical communicator as engaging in an ethically and linguistically neutral activity” (44).
Slack argument echoes that of Vaughn’s initial assumption that she would find “amoral
calculations” on the part of NASA managers the night of the launch, when instead she found
a much more complicated system at work.

High Reliability Organizations
Technical communication scholars often work to navigate the tensions between
“truth” through the social and positivistic theories, which are demonstrated in both
Tompkins and Vaughn’s studies. As Miller argued, “Facts do not exist independently, waiting
to be found and collected and systemized; facts are human constructions which presupposed
theories” (51). Both Vaugn and Tompkins accounts of the later disasters in conjunction with
the Monday Notes allows a narrative to emerge about how this organization worked to make
sense of the data available. Miller further argued, “Scientific verification requires the
persuasion of an audience that what has been ‘observed’ is replicable and relevant” (52-52).
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The conversations a work group has, their texts, and their culture all work together to build
their “truth.” The Monday Notes provide a starting point to NASA’s narrative by providing
some of the earliest links and earliest glimpses into the organization’s drift into structural
secrecy. Tompkins’ narrative contrasted the later culture of NASA after the Challenger and
Columbia with that of the communication structure at MSFC during Apollo, in which the
actants relied on the Monday Notes, which according to Tompkins, resulted in a system free
of structural secrecy, a system that aimed to seek out bad news rather than bury it, a principle
associated with High Reliability Organizations (HRO’s) (Tompkins 83). HRO’s also aim to
operate with a “deference to expertise,” rather than a deference to authority (Weick &
Sutcliff 15). According to Tompkins, “The requirement of hearing from all the disciplines,
including the management jargon, forced all parties to learn the different technical dialects
and their different assumptions and premises. No single dialect was allowed to dominate and
screen out others” (105). Thus, the Monday Notes aimed to emulate this principle of
HRO’s respecting that “Rigid hierarchies have their own special vulnerability to error. Errors
at higher levels tend to pick up and combine with errors at lower levels, thereby making the
resulting problem bigger, harder to comprehend, and more prone to escalation” (Weick &
Sutcliff 15). As I describe in the next section, the way in which NASA was originally
assembled placed several different organizations together, each with different philosophies
and likely “different technical dialects and their different assumptions.”
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Assemblage and the Arsenal Concept
While the later drift into structural secrecy was unintentional and largely
unanticipated, NASA’s later vulnerability for structural secrecy seems rooted, at least in part,
in its original formation. To demonstrate this vulnerability, I turn to Staggers’ study
Learning to Love the Bomb: Secrecy and Denial in the Atomic City. In her study, Staggers
looked at the beginning of the process of the separation and compartmentalization of labor,
which made it possible to maintain secrecy during the project. Staggers describes the
requirements for compartmentalization of information during Manhattan as “addressed
specifically in the United States Army Regulation 380-5, which stipulated the methods and
processes for safeguarding of military information” (61). Of particular interest, she notes,
“First, an individual was to receive access to classified information only if he needed the
information in order to carry out his job; second, the individual was to be given only the
‘minimal necessary [information] for the proper performance of his duties’” (62). Relying
heavily on Foucault, Staggers traces what she terms “the production of docile bodies in
Hanford,” and she argued “the widespread institutional practice of compartmentalization
was essential to the development of secrecy discourse and a secrecy culture at Hanford” (60).
Staggers describes an intentional compartmentalization or secrecy in which “individuals [did]
not have access to any information beyond that which was minimally necessary in order to
carry out their jobs,” and the information was divided into a classification system comprised
of “top secret, secret, confidential or restricted” (73). She further describes the importance
classification and rank held in Hanford: “Military rank was just the tip of the hierarchal
iceberg. At Hanford Engineer Works (HEW), military rank stratified Army personnel; job
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title and function in Du Pont’s corporate hierarchy stratified the civilian personnel; and the
information classification system stratified everyone according to their security clearance”
(82). In contrast, NASA’s communicative practices were not designed to create secrecy, and
thus structural secrecy became an unintended detriment to the organization. The separation
and compartmentalization came to a breaking point in both the Challenger and Columbia
launches, leading to the death of astronauts, and ultimately the death of the space shuttle
program. But, NASA shares some deep military roots with Hanford, which historically have
contributed to compartmentalization and secrecy throughout the network.
NASA’s military roots stem from its initial organization. Often viewed as a single
entity under the umbrella of the “NASA Agency,” NASA is really comprised of 10 distinct
centers. Until recently, these centers operated in more of a modular fashion, rather than as a
distributed workgroup. Tompkins describes NASA’s formation as less of a creation and more
of an assemblage. NASA was created in 1958 “for the peaceful exploration of space and to
catch up with the soviets” (52), and NASA was originally paired with three labs that grew
out of an initiative following World War I called the National Advisory Committee for
Aeronautics (NACA). NACA was focused on “rockets and missiles [regarded as weapons,]
and as such their development was logically assigned to the three branches of the military
service, the Air Force, Army, and Navy” (Tompkins, 54). As NACA grew, “a number of
existing organizations were merged and new ones were added to them” beginning with the
Langley Memorial Aeronautical Laboratory and later expanding to include Ames
Aeronautical Laboratory, the Lewis Flight Propulsion Laboratory, and even later, Marshall
Space Flight Center and Johnson Space Center (JSC) (52). Because of this, Tompkins notes,
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“NASA never had one culture, it has had from the beginning a confederation of cultures”
(51). Each of these cultures brought with it a different sense of identity. When NASA was
created, some field centers, such as MSFC originally organized around the “arsenal concept,”
a philosophy that called for mostly civil servant employees to keep the technical talent in
house (Tompkins, 54). Marshall was staffed with rocket engineers from the Army’s Redstone
Arsenal, “[these engineers] would retain the arsenal concept thy practiced in the Army even
though they were now members of a civilian agency” (Tompkins, 55). This philosophy was
not shared by all field centers, however, and JSC, in particular, largely rejected this
philosophy and relied more heavily on contractors than did other field centers (Tompkins,
59). Regardless of its heavy reliance on contractors, JSC still held certain positions such as
Astronauts and Mission control roles as exclusively for civil servants, a practice that served to
widen the uneven power dynamic (Tompkins, 59). Von Braun, in contrast, fought for a
larger civil servant base and wanted to keep the technical talent in-house. But, NASA
overruled von Braun, “beginning a trend that would continue for the next several decades in
which the Marshall Center shrank and the contractor corps grew” (Tompkins, 71). NASA’s
military roots combined with the increasingly divergent and somewhat strained network
worked to create a detrimental system of structural secrecy.

Deference to Hierarchy
Structural secrecy and concerns of hierarchy can function in opposition to HRO’s
concern with “deference to expertise” as the expertise can easily become buried within the
structure. But, even as the center was attempting to privilege “deference to expertise” over a
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“deference to hierarchy,” the group at MSFC still tended to separate participants and groups,
dividing those “inside” the organization and those “outside” the organization (contractors,
military partners, etc.).
As described above, the deference to hierarchy over expertise was seen during the
Challenger accident and again during the Columbia accident. As the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board (CAIB) found noting, “Allegiance to hierarchy and procedure had
replaces deference to NASA engineers’ technical expertise” (200-201). Initial reports of the
Columbia launch reported that debris (later identified as foam) hit the wing and damaged a
tile (Tompkins 11). Similar to the earlier debates concerning the O-rings, the foam damage
was not considered a flight-safety issue because previous shuttles has suffered damage from
debris and still safely completed their respective missions (i.e. normalization of deviance)
(Tompkins 241). That is, once again the data said it was safe. But, NASA engineer, Rodney
Rocha was concerned the damage to the shuttle was serious, and the photographs they were
able to get with their equipment were not clear enough to make a determination of the
damage to the shuttle (Tompkins, 237). In an email to NASA managers, Rocha wrote, “Can
we petition (beg) for outside agency assistance” (Tompkins 237-238). But, the managers had
already been insisting that there was not a safety issue, and so they “canceled Rocha’s request
and two similar requests from other engineers associated with the mission” (Tompkins 238).
NASA used Boeings Crater modeling program to attempt to determine the severity of the
debris strike, but the information received was unclear (Tompkins 134). “NASA was
dependent on Boeing for the Crater analysis of foam debris damage. But there was a
reciprocal dependence as well, in which the vendor tried to make the customer’s management
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happy,” which resulted in what was later called a “flawed analysis” (Tompkins 184 & 239).
In addition “Mission manager Linda Ham considered the requested and asked who was
requesting the additional images of Columbia, rather than what the merits of the request
were. At that time, rank mattered at NASA, and rank and expertise did not necessarily
coincide.” (Weick & Sutcliffe p. 75). The CAIB also noted, “The Space Shuttle Program had
altered its structure by outsourcing to contractors, which added to the communication
problems,” and that key inspections that “were once done by NASA employees were now
done by contractor personnel” (Tompkins 183 & 156). The tensions surrounding the heavy
outsourcing to contractors were exacerbated by issues with separation of status between the
civil servants and the contractors. The Monday Notes show the deference to hierarchy was
already in place, in some ways, at MSFC during the 60’s. As described in the next section,
the separation of status of the contractors, military, and other MSFC partners, combined
with von Braun’s tendency toward the arsenal concept to create mistrust in those outside of
his work group. As I demonstrate in the Monday Notes section, the separation of status and
mistrust of these outside contractors is evidenced in the conversations von Braun an his
group had in the Monday Notes.

Separation of Status
Separation of status was one of the most obvious and embedded ways structural
secrecy began to grow in the organization. From the very beginning, von Braun wanted to
keep as many of his projects in the hands of his own people, and failing that, he wanted a
strong surveillance program to keep watch on those “outside” his part of the NASA
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organization. In Tompkins’ text, the concept of separation of status begins to bleed into the
concept of organizational identification. Tompkins described organizational identification as
The construct of organizational identification is one with which I am identified; it
has its origins in my experience at the Marshall Center. I noticed the pride that
NASA employees took in their work, their lab, their space center and its missions and
projects. They had models of NASA rockets on their desks, photographs of rockets
on their walls. They worked long hours without extra pay. They looked for new tasks
and new responsibilities not assigned to them. They exhibited many manifestations
of their commitment; one could see this dimension of culture in their actions; it was
palpable. I could both see and infer their identification with the culture by working
with them. (106)
Tompkins description of the concept of organizational identification is key to my
investigation of the Monday Notes. Prior to my PhD program, I had the opportunity to
work for a NASA contractor, but I too experienced the identification Tompkins describes. I
also began to identify with the organization, both with those work worked for NASA as well
as those who worked with NASA. Describing organizational identification only in terms of
those who work directly for NASA serves to further increase the separation of status still
faced by NASA’s partners today.
As contractors represent their own entities, somewhat outside of NASA, this adds to
the danger of structural secrecy. Vaughn further argued, “Distance—both physical and
social—Interferes with efforts of those at the top to ‘know’ the behavior of others in the
organization—and vice versa” (251). NASA’s historical reliance on contractors leads to a
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network of actors that are both inside and outside of the organization complicating
communication processes. Those outside (contractors, the military, etc.) of the network may
not formally be part of the inside network of the organization, but they are part of the
network, as Latour argues, “one does not jump outside network to add an explanation—a
cause a factor, a set of factors, a series of co-occurrences; one simply extends the network
further” (376). NASA is essentially one large network full of much smaller (and very diverse)
“other” networks. Because contractors are such a large part of the workforce at NASA it’s
difficult to even define necessarily who is inside and who is outside, especially because the
lines are often blurred with people essentially occupying roles that take them inside and
outside the formal boundaries of the organization. But, identifying as inside or outside does
matter, and contractors can be impacted by their perception of their role in the organization.
As Vaughn argues, there is a “subtle but significant link between a person’s position in an
organization, access to information, ability to interpret it, worldview, and ultimately action”
(239). NASA’s initial formation led to a system comprised of very separate workgroups
resulting in complicating the communicative structure.
NASA has historically relied fairly heavily on contractors, but in the aftermath of the
Challenger disaster, NASA civil servants seem fairly quick to distance themselves from the
decisions that may have ultimately led to the organization making mistakes. NASA scholars
often point to the better-known breakdown in communication between Morton Thiokol,
the infamous O-ring manufacturer and NASA civil servants on the eve of the Challenger
Launch. Vaughn in particular traced the sequence of events on that night in her project and
found significant tension and shifting of blame between the civil servant engineers and
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NASA. Both Tompkins and Vaughn pointed to emerging technologies, such as email, as a
contributing factor to structural secrecy in the sense that it lead to what Vaughn referred to
as a “blizzard of paperwork,” which was intended to make sure everyone had the maximum
amount of information, but in effect meant that information inevitably got lost in the pile.
But, it wasn’t just the amount of information that became a problem in the later years. The
communication problem combined with the separation of status to create a situation in
which the contractors were seen as “separate” and also seen as lacking sufficient levels of
organizational identification.
To illustrate some of the tensions, I draw on the classic example of the O-rings and
the contractor tensions that Vaughn described in her study. The O-rings were part of the
Sold Rocket Boosters (SRBs), and NASA had awarded the SRB contract Morton Thiokol,
“despite the firm being ranked the lowest of the four bids” (Vaughn, 42). This decision, in
part, Vaughn argued led some to argue “NASA has started out doing the ‘shuttle on the
cheap,’ apparently compromising safety in the process” (42). The use of contractors was and
is standard practice and many part of any given space vehicles have typically been designed
by outside contractors, which lead to many workgroups with various levels of approval needs
prior to each shuttle launch. Because of this the flights went through a Flight Readiness
Review (FRR) prior to each launch and each workgroup had to check off their respective
piece of the shuttle. Because space travel is inherently dangerous the workgroups were
looking for “acceptable risk,” which is, in short, “the accumulated risk of each component
(Vaughn, 82).
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Each of the different parts of the shuttle were classified in following groups
according to how critical they were to mission and safety:

•

Criticality 1: Loss of life or vehicle if the component fails

•

Criticality 2: Loss of mission

•

Criticality 3: All others

•

Criticality 1R: Redundant components, the failure of both could cause loss of life or
vehicle

•

Criticality 2R: Redundant components, the failure of both could cause loss of
mission. (Vaughn 56)

The O-rings were originally part of the C1R category because they had a second O-ring in
case the first one failed. The O-rings were eventually moved to the C1 category after several
shuttles returned with damage to both O-rings. A part belonging to the C1 category didn’t
mean that the shuttle couldn’t fly with the problem; it just meant the part required extra
vigilance during the flight readiness review. For example, the wings were in this category
because they are necessary, but they weren’t necessarily a problem. These parts were given
extra attention prior to launch, as well as studied after the shuttle returned. In the case of the
O-rings, they were inspected on launch and return by the engineering firm, NASA engineers
from Marshall Space Flight Center, and managers. This multi-part inspection process
happened on each of the C1 parts (Vaughn, 110).
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To complicate matters further, according to Vaughn, the engineers and contractors
operated with “the engineering maxim, ‘change is bad,’ due, of course to cost and time
constraints, so instead of redesign they would tweak and test the parts (Vaughn,127). This
process required more cooperation between the contractors and the Marshall engineers, and
highlights some of the problems with the communications between the different workgroups,
and how the public later viewed the communications between the workgroups. One engineer,
in particular, was often a voice of concern over the known limitations of the O-rings, and
stated in a memo, “that for there to be ‘no change’ in the design was ‘unacceptable’”
(Vaughn, 113), and while changing the design would have been preferable, “he believed
fixing the joint was a satisfactory measure (and stated that in the memos)” (Vaughn, 113).
These memos and meetings outline some of the ways this particular group of people began
to form themselves into a “workgroup,” and some of the norms that the workgroup began to
take on. As Vaughn notes, the workgroup began to create these norms as the first shuttle
came back showing potential problems with the O-rings: “As Thiokol and Marshall
Engineers and managers responded to the first signals of potential danger, they committed
themselves to certain engineering methods, theories, and procedures. The decision process
itself generates commitment to the group stance” (112).
This more horizontal workgroup system also creates a different dynamic when things
go wrong than you would typically see in a more linear, hierarchical system. There is more
room for finger pointing (i.e. It’s not MY organization that created that problem, it’s THAT
organization). A dynamic that was seen after the Challenger explosion, as illustrated here
from both sides after testimony following the disaster:
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•

“Thiokol engineers’ testified that they perceived Marshal management’s response to
the no-launch recommendation as pressure” (Vaughn, 41).

•

“Marshal managers requested that Thiokol representatives transmit their launch
recommendation in writing to Kennedy Space Center . . . Marshall manager wanted
proof that they had proceeded upon advice from Thiokol. Then, should anything go
wrong with the O-rings, Thiokol would bear the brunt of the responsibility”
(Vaughn, 41).

This ability to move blame from one organization to another could strain workgroup
relations, but it may benefit the larger organization (in this case NASA) because they likely
have more resources to fight than a smaller contracting firm would have. In studying the
Challenger disaster, according to Tompkins, we began to see the emergence of a reversal of
the burden of proof. Prior to the Challenger, the burden of proof on the engineers was to
prove the shuttle was safe to fly. Beginning with the Challenger, according to Tompkins, the
burden shifted to proving that the shuttle was not safe to fly (115).
Though contractors make up the bulk of workers at NASA, NASA doesn’t necessarily
see contractors as equal or even nearly equal to the civil servants, which in an organization so
large and dependent on safety and cost-savings can spell trouble. Indeed, rather than
encouraging a unified environment among civil servants and contractors, NASA continued
to mandate separation. In a memo dated December 27, 2000, NASA’s Inspector General
outlined violations in contractor usage found in an “Assessment of Agencywide Use of
Support Service Contractors at NASA” (hq.nasa.gov). The date of this memo is significant as
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many experts argue that ineffective communication and the heavy use of contractors led to
both the Challenger and Columbia disasters. Both Tompkins and Vaughn argue that many
of the issues that were present in the Challenger disaster in 1986 were still a problem when
Columbia disintegrated in 2003. This memo outlines some of the violations the inspector
general found during the assessment and notes violations at various space centers, including
JSC. The violations, in particular, relate to the use of contractors to perform tasks that might
lead to conflicting interests or give the contractor power to make decisions that NASA feels
are better left to civil servant employees. This memo documents the reasons NASA objects to
using contractors in this manner, and also mandates that contractors should never find
themselves in a hierarchal relationship with a NASA civil servant employee; that is,
contractors should only be supervised by the company they actually work for. These
guidelines outline very specific areas that should be considered when working with
contractors on-site at a NASA center. The document states contractors should have “different
colored security badges, special identifiers in telephone directories, company identifiers on email addresses and organization charts, and physically separate offices space” (hq.nasa.gov).
These guidelines clearly separate civil servants from contractors and could lead to contractors
feeling like they are not really part of the team. The memo talks in depth about keeping
workspaces separate, to the point that the guideline reads: “Intermingle workstations to the
point that a reasonable, casual observer cannot distinguish the civil servant from the
contractor workers [is prohibited]” (hq.nasa.gov). This type of obvious separation could lead
to contractors feeling “less” than civil servants and possibly lower their morale and
motivation. In addition, as Tompkins notes this separation also causes resentment on the
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part of the civil servants; he found “There was resentment when money went to contractor
personnel who displaced able NASA people. The felt the system was strengthened when
MSFC had technical expertise in depth, the better to monitor the contractors who, after all,
had to make a profit” (59). These separations and resentments, coupled with the lack of trust
in contractors, can make contractors feel like outsiders. While NASA’s reasons for this
separation may be valid, the accompanying guidelines on “Distinguishing Between Civil
Servants and Contractors Can Be Improved” shows how deep the separation is between the
two groups, a separation that can lead to resentment and ineffective communication on both
sides (hq.nasa.gov). And, yet, these outsiders are working on critical space missions. As I will
demonstrate in the next section, many of these issues are evident in the Monday Notes
possibly demonstrating the organization was already becoming vulnerable to structural
secrecy.

The Monday Notes
The Monday Notes show von Braun’s tendency toward territorialism, which played
out in various ways through deference to hierarchy and separation of status. That he
preferred to operate under the arsenal concept seems to be the root of these problems. I will
first describe the meta-notes, which will more fully demonstrate how the Monday Note
functioned. The meta-notes also include some of the first indications that communication
was not as open as it seemed. I then present contractor tensions to demonstrate how von
Braun’s early attitudes and assumptions about contractors echo those of the Challenger and
Columbia accidents.
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The Meta Notes
During the first couple of years, von Braun and his team spent some time working
out the purpose, function, and format of the Monday Notes. While the Monday Notes
archive starts on August 30, 1961, the first entry I can be reasonable confident was a metanote was dated October 23, 1961. The first note of the archive gets right into progress,
problems, and updates without any reference to the notes themselves. This somewhat abrupt
beginning suggests to me that either some earlier notes were not included in the archive or
the Monday Notes themselves came to fruition following either oral conversations or some
other means that were not included in the archive. The first meta-note concerns questions of
double work and gives an example of how the Monday Notes functioned in practice (See
Figure 1). The notes also demonstrate the illegibility of the archive in general, but also how
von Braun would comment back and forth with his team. In Figure 1, the first hand written
comments are those from von Braun, and the second set was from his assistant, McCall. The
example in Figure 1, shows how the notes functioned.
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Figure 1 October 23, 1961

Many of the early Monday Notes show von Braun and his team working through the
purpose of the notes and how they should be formatted and function. Von Braun, in
particular, showed attention to document design and clarity. He would often make quick
spelling corrections or complain about spacing and ambiguous headings (See Figure 2).
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Figure 2 Novermber 13, 1961

Through these corrections and attention to detail, von Braun seemed to be displaying a
concern for both clarity and ease of reading and a desire to ensure that the communications
among his team were as consistent as possible. At the same time, von Braun’s handwriting
proved somewhat hard to decipher, which left places where I was unable to determine his
exact response. Tompkins described the Monday Notes in more detail based on his firsthand account of the organization:
[Von Bruan] asked about two dozen managers (all of whom I interviewed), lab
directors in RDO and project managers in IO who were removed from him by at
least one layer of management, to send him a weekly, one-page note summarizing the
problems encountered and progress made during the week. Simplicity was the key.
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There was no form to be filled out. Requirements: no more than one page, headed by
the date and the name of the contributor. They were due in von Braun’s office each
Monday morning. In this way a layer of management was bypassed on the way up.
(The Directors of IO and RDO were by-passed but could read the notes; they just
couldn’t change them in any way. (82).
The fairly casual nature of many of the notes combined with the many serious discussions
they had within them suggests the participants were invested in the organization and its
success. Von Braun’s attention to document design points to a commitment to clarity, but
his attention to document design could also signal a move toward authority. That is, while
the Monday Notes were theoretically informal, his attention might have served as a reminder
of who was in control. As Tompkins described, sometimes the Monday Notes were used by
the team to challenge issues, and he quoted a lab director as saying, with a “disingenuous
smile,” “We sometimes misuse them—to get attention” (84). From this, Tompkins wrote,
“In other words, the notes provided a public forum and a court of last resort” (84). At the very
least, von Braun’s attention to document design details would have shown his team that he
was paying very close attention to all aspects of the Monday Notes.
While von Braun expected clear communications from his team, he also seemed to
have expected the communications to remain with his team, as Figure 3 demonstrates. Here
von Braun explicitly references who should have access to the Monday Notes. In Figure 3,
von Braun’s assistant McCall writes, “Regarding the memorandum dated October 15, 1962,
stating the copies of NOTES will now be distributed to all creators of the NOTES, it should
be added that these notes are for the division directors only, and should not be reproduced or
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distributed into the organization.” McCall’s statement’s specific meaning here is somewhat
unclear, but Tompkins reported that after von Braun read and annotated the notes, they
were “reproduced and returned as a package to all of the contributors” (83). The memo in
Figure 3 suggests this might not have been a consistent practice, at least as it pertained to all
of the contributors. Instead, this particular note indicates they may have either wanted them
mostly restricted to senior members or perhaps they changed their practices over time.
Restricting who was actually included in and who was privy to the information contained in
the notes suggests that the information was being keep pretty tightly bound within the
confines of von Braun and his more senior leaders. These early meta-notes show the
building of von Braun’s system of management, a system that von Braun likely thought
necessary for keeping control of his project. According to Foucault:
As the machinery of production became larger and more complex, as the number of
workers and the division of labour increased, supervision became ever more necessary
and more difficult. It became a special function, which had nevertheless to form an
integral part of the production process” (174-75) Discipline and punish.
Through the system of the Monday Notes, von Braun was beginning to establish not just a
communication system, but also a surveillance system. He was establishing a method for
keeping key members informed, but he was also establishing his authority.
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Figure 3 October 17, 1962

Following Figure 3, Figure 4 shows the early distribution list of the Monday Notes:

Figure 4 October 17, 1962 Distribution List
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Further evidence in the meta-notes point suggests that while von Braun wanted
consistent, open communication with his team, he didn’t necessarily welcome consistent,
open communication with those outside of his team. Figure 5 points instead to a group that
was already leaning toward structural secrecy. Von Braun wrote
There is some evidence to indicate that, contrary to my instructions, copies of the
completed package of Weekly NOTES are being made available to persons other
than those listed on the distribution. This is to emphasize that I do not approve of
this practice as it has the effect of restricting information, which goes into the
NOTES as well as my handwritten comments in reply to this information. Your
cooperation in maintaining this system on a frank, informal, tightly restricted basis
will be appreciated. (See Figure 5).

Figure 5 April 1, 1963
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For von Braun, then, information while not to be censored, was to be restricted
among certain participants. According to Tompkins, the Monday Notes included about two
dozen managers, a number that shifted over the years (83). However, Tompkins also noted
the Monday Notes sparked Friday Notes further down the hierarchical line with the
managers and directors holding meetings with their teams to determine what should be
included in the Monday Notes. Tompkins wrote, “In short, von Braun’s simple request for a
weekly note had generated a rigorous and regularly recurring discipline of communication
within the organization” (84). But, the Friday Notes themselves point to possible structural
secrecy, as the Monday Notes were to contain all the relevant information. A decision made
to leave out information from a Friday Note to a Monday Note is very similar to the
problems Vaughn and Tompkins described with the later structural secrecy. Vaughn noted
after the Challenger, “Official organizational practices, including problem resolution and
reporting rules that reduced the amount of information going to the top, operated to
systematically censor what was relayed upward on the eve of the launch” (346). Vaughn
argued when a hazard fell under the definition of Acceptable Risk the hazard was not
necessarily news that would need to be reported up the line. That is, the group making the
decision on what to report may not have thought an Acceptable Risk hazard would have
been relevant enough to include in a report to management. The language of “strict,
informal, tightly restricted basis” does match up well with Tompkins’ descriptions of
achieving a means of obtaining feedback from von Braun, but “tightly restricted” seems to
clearly indicate that despite the narrative of “open communication” it was likely only open to
a handful of leaders. For these leaders to then meet with their teams on Friday to determine
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what to include in the Monday Notes possibly left the door open for information to fall
through the cracks. Tompkins argued the system of the Monday Notes had the clear
advantage of guarding against structural secrecy, arguing, “Whereas many organizations
suppress bad news, this one sought it out” (83). However, the concept of Acceptable Risk
described above likely complicated the groups’ efforts to seek out bad news. Vaughn argued,
“Accumulating incrementally, information about the O-ring anomalies looked very different
to the work group than it did to outsiders, who viewed it knowing the disastrous outcome.
According to Vaughn, “Signals were mixed: information indicating trouble was interspersed
with and/or followed by information signaling that all was well. Signals were weak:
information was informal and/or ambiguous, so that the threat to flight safety was not clear”
(244). Therefore the danger posed is often only really clear in hindsight, a concept referred
to as hindsight bias. Tompkins argued the Monday Notes also worked to guard against
hindsight bias. Tompkins cited Weick and Ashford as arguing the practices in the Monday
Notes would have worked to reduced hindsight bias:
In hindsight, there appears to be one best way and nothing much to learn. This
conclusion is troublesome because it was arrived at through severe editing out of
complexity and ambiguity present at the time the action originally unfolded. Those
complexities might suggest the wisdom of different choices in the future.
Unfortunately, those complexities can’t be retrieved once justification has masked
them (emphasis added by Tompkins). However, frequent communication, such as is
represented by the Monday Notes, is one way to prevent such masking (86)
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According to the above passage from Weick and Ashford, one of the ways to guard against
hindsight bias is to analyze failures and learn from them. While experts and scholars
generally regard the processes used during Apollo to have been superior to those used later,
the Apollo Review Board found, in part, “Those organizations responsible for the planning,
conduct, and safety of this test failed to identify it as being hazardous;” and “Adequate safety
precautions were neither established or observed for this test”
(http://history.nasa.gov/Apollo204/find.html). Thus, while the concept of Acceptable Risk
came later in NASA’s history, it seems likely some of the relevant information got lost in the
decisions made in the Friday Note meetings and the information that ultimately made it up
the ladder to von Braun. The frequency and feedback of the notes might very well have
helped guard against structural secrecy, but the prescribed length of no more than one page
might have led to groups’ unintentionally censoring key information.
On the other hand, the Monday Notes do show evidence of von Braun’s dedication
to communication. Von Braun expected to receive updates each week from each of his key
members, and if he did not receive a note for a week or two, he would often respond either
with a casual inquiry or, sometimes, with a more direct request (See Figure 6) with a
suggestion that the Monday Notes were not optional. Because the Monday Notes were not
only a means of getting the information out to the team but also a means for von Braun to
closely monitor the progress of the project and his team. Von Braun’s attention to the
absence of notes demonstrates his commitment to keeping both himself and his team’s
informed.
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Figure 6 No Report Filed

The meta-notes tell us more than just how the Monday Notes operated in practice.
They also begin to provide a glimpse into von Braun’s personality and leadership style.
Tompkins often noted (as do many historians) that von Braun was seen as a leader first and
an engineer second. Within these notes, his humor and compassion demonstrate he was a
man who was invested in the success of his team. As invested as he was in his team, however,
structural secrecy is often not plainly visible. In the examples above, von Braun may seem to
be keeping the information close to the team, but structural secrecy works to hide
information even as participants work to keep it open. In the case of MSFC, and NASA as a
whole, the issues I discussed previously, including separation of status, deference to hierarchy,
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and normalization of deviance often come into play and these factors work to conceal
information.
The overall program during the Apollo days is often seen as far more rigorous than
the organization’s later drift into structural secrecy, but at the same time, those working on
the Apollo project didn’t have much hindsight to fall back on. They were instead engaged in
a risky business that was inevitably going to suffer challenges, set backs, and, unfortunately
disaster. The Report of the Presidential Commission of the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident
demonstrates some acknowledgement of the drift from rigorous processes to less effective
processes:
According to the unrelenting pressure to meet the demands of an accelerating flight
schedule might have been adequately handled by NASA if it had insisted upon the
exactingly thorough procedures that were its hallmark during the Apollo program.
An extensive and redundant safety program comprising interdependent safety,
reliability and quality assurance functions existed during and after the lunar program
to discover any potential safety problems. Between that period and 1986, however,
the program became ineffective. This loss of effectiveness seriously degraded the
checks and balances essential for maintaining flight safety .
(http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v1ch7.htm)
The Monday Notes demonstrate von Braun’s determination to maintain effective
communication practices, but structural secrecy (as defined in this project) is invisible. While
the meta notes show the first tiny cracks in the system, von Braun’s attitude toward the
center’s partners begin to demonstrate larger cracks in the foundation.
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Partner Tensions
Von Braun’s desire to keep most of the technical talent in house combined with his
lack of trust in those outside of Marshall is evident through out the Monday Notes. Both
Tompkins and Vaughn later pointed to the separation of status between the contractors and
civil servants, and this separation of status in one of the elements of the Apollo projects that
most closely resembles the same separation of status in the later decades. I was initially drawn
to this archive and this project by questions of where contractors were located in relation to
the NASA centers both physically and metaphorically and how they were regarded as
participants that operated both inside and outside the organization.
In the earlier discussion of the Challenger, researchers contrast the later safety climate
of NASA with that of the earlier safety climate during Apollo. Evidence of Tompkins claim
that the burden was originally more centered on being safe to fly, rather than safe not to fly is
illustrated in some of the earlier Monday Notes; but so are early tensions between contractors
and MSFC. The contractor tensions run rampant throughout the notes, as do tensions with
military partners, the government, the media, and even educational partners. For the
purposes of illustration, I’ve selected a small tracing of contractor tensions involving
contractors involved in the Centaur project and the participants on von Braun’s team.
In a memo dated November 6, 1961 (See Figure 7), Debus’s comments demonstrate
some of what Tompkins described as wanting to make sure it was safe to launch:
A successful launch at the earliest possible date is the prime requirement….not just a
launch at the earliest possible date” (See Figure 7). Debus also begins to highlight
some of the tensions and also demonstrates the tight hold and surveillance von Braun
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expected of his team while working with contractors. In particular, Debus quotes
Dixon as saying, “We in government have a responsibility to look into what
contractors are doing and see that they do it properly. The responsibility for Centaur
is MSFC. Therefore, they will dig into the program and direct it. (Figure 7)

Figure 7 November 6, 1961

This quote seems to demonstrate Tompkins references to the arsenal model, in which if von
Braun couldn’t keep the technical talent in house, then he at least wanted to keep a close eye
on the contractors. But, this separation and surveillance seems to signal a lack of trust, and
one of the biggest hurdles Tompkins identified during this time for MSFC was a struggle
with this separation of status. As Tompkins describes, the arsenal concept followed from the
Army’s approach to developing weapons (70). Tompkins wrote, “Under its arsenal concept
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of developing weapons, the Army had maintained an in-house technical capability that
permitted it to conduct its own research and development (R&D), including the capability
of manufacturing weapon prototypes” (70). In contrast to the arsenal concept, the Air
Force’s approach “maintained little technical expertise, relying instead on private contractors
to propose new weapons, conduct the R&D, and manufacture the planes and missiles” (70).
Citing the CAIB Report, Tompkins the heavy use of contractors was, in part, what began to
lead to the culture of structural secrecy (183). This passage from the CAIB Report seems to
support is argument:
NASA structure changed as roles and responsibilities were transferred to contractors,
which increased the dependence on the private sector for safety functions and risk
assessment while simultaneously reducing the in-house capability to spot safety issues
(202).
The language used in this memo suggests those on von Braun’s team were aware of the
potential problems with giving the contractors too much responsibility, or at least too much
responsibility without oversight.
The separation of status is evident in many of the memos. As they continue in this
thread, another team member, Haeussermann demonstrated the separation of status with
both his language choice and with references to “blame” similar to those used in above in
reference to the Challenger accident. This passage, in particular, demonstrates the separation
of status:
a. MSFC patiently listened (7 hours) to the GD/A presentation on 11/9 on the
proposed modifications to the Centaur guidance system and the preliminary

63
evaluation of the piggy-back flight. The main positive results of the meeting were: 1.
Convair admitted all the systems’ shortcoming of all the system’s shortcomings
(previously stressed by MSFC) (previously stressed by the MSFC) and recommended
improvements (many originated in MSFC); 2. Adoption of recommendations is
mainly a funding question; 3. We will evaluate the recommendations and GD/A will
follow up with cost proposals; 4. Certain improvements in the Librascope Computer
will be defined this week in the meeting at Librascope; 5. The atmosphere was
friendly and cooperation will improve. (See Figure 8).
The above passage contains several key piece that point to the separation of status
between General Dynamic (?) and the civil servants at MSFC at this time. The reference to
“patiently listened” seems to point to a pandering of sorts on the part of the civil servants
involved in the meeting. But, the references to the shortcomings (“previously stressed by
MSFC” and “many originated in MSFC”) demonstrate a similar atmosphere of blame
shifting as the previous example between Morton Thiokol and NASA on the eve of the
Challenger launch. Further, “cooperation will improve” indicates the civil servants worked to
address an apparent divide between the contractors and themselves.
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Figure 8 November 13, 1961

In Figure 9, Debus follows up on the Centaur situation, writing,
Action is well underway between LOD and Convair to firm up the text plans for
Centaur to meet with the MSFC test philosophies. There is a marked difference in
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the attitude of certain personnel at the cape following our meeting with Dempsey,
Davis et al. (See Figure 9)
This passage suggests that the tensions were ongoing during this part of the project, but the
passage also points again to von Braun’s desire to keep a close watch on contractors to make
certain the contractors were maintaining and following the quality standards set forth by von
Braun and his team.

Figure 9 November 13, 1961

The above tracing of the tensions between the contractor and MSFC demonstrates
the separation of status and lack of trust those at MSFC showed the contractors working on
the projects with them. My intention here is not to take issue with von Braun’s desire to dig
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into the contractors’ activities. These were all risky operations, and the added layers and
networks of contractors added to the complexity. Tompkins argued in the later shuttle
disasters, “In the Challenger case NASA was dependent on Thiokol for risk assessment of the
O-ring … and in the Columbia case, NASA was dependent on Boeing for he Crater analysis
of foam debris damage” (184). Being dependent on contractors to tell him there might be a
problem was what von Braun was likely trying to avoid. According to Tompkins, NASA’s
priorities suffered a reversal in the decades after Apollo. The CAIB seems to have agreed:
NASA’s culture of bureaucratic accountability emphasized chain of command,
procedure, following the rules, and going by the book. While rules and procedures
were essential for coordination, they had an unintended but negative effect.
Allegiance to hierarchy and procedure had replaced deference to NASA engineers’
technical expertise” (200).
In Drift into Failure, Dekker asked, “How did history and culture contribute? What were the
influences of fluctuating competitive pressures in the environment?” Tompkins describes the
Monday Notes almost as insurance against structural secrecy, and the notes themselves
demonstrate how involved von Braun was in each element of the project. At the same time,
the notes demonstrate the roots of some of the later problems with separation of status.
Unlike Staggers’ works, which explores a more intentional structure of secrecy, I am
interested in exploring how a large organization drifts into structural secrecy unintentionally.
Dekker wrote, “The Colombia accident investigation tried to trace how the original
compromises that were required to gain approval for the shuttle interacted with subsequent
decades of resources constrain, fluctuating priorities of successive federal administrations,
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schedule pressures, the characterization of the Shuttle as operational, and the lack of an
agreed national vision for human space flight” (63). Overall, the Monday Notes fit
Tompkins description, and those involved did seem intent on ferreting out problems, the
structure itself, particularly as it pertains to partner relations, seems to have set the stage for
later communication problems.
While it is unclear whether the much of the information from the Monday Notes
successfully ever reached the contractors, the contractors involved in the Apollo project did
interact closed with civil servants through von Braun’s program of contractor penetration
(Tompkins, 88). Von Braun insisted on, at most, 90% contractor involvement in each
mission, with at least 10% civil servants working on the projects alongside the contractors
(Tompkins, 60). The civil servants would work at the contractors’ manufacturing sites, and
often know as much if not more about the status of the manufacturing and the research and
development (Tompkins, 88). In addition, the engineers would put the part produced
through their own tests (Tompkins, 58). For example, Tompkins describes a typical testing
situation:
Giant test stands gripped rocked engines so that they could be fired without
producing an unscheduled launch from Alabama. When the contractor responsible
for building and testing them would deliver them to MSFC, the engineers would put
them through their own test. This usually irritated the contractors, making them feel
as though they weren’t trusted. Well they weren’t. (Tompkins, 58)
Unfortunately, the Monday Notes do not provide direct accounts from the
contractors, so we only get the perspective of a handful of civil servants who were working
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directly with von Braun. But, these patterns of communication between those inside and
outside of MSFC continued through the decades, and communications between NASA and
the O-ring manufacturer Morton-Thiokol follow a similar pattern. According to Vaughn,
NASA attempted to increase the flow over information—and hypothetically knowledge—
between groups, which resulted in a “blizzard of paperwork” according to Vaughn, but
instead led to information that was overlooked or deemed unimportant (250). In one
example, Morton-Thiokol complained:
We are currently being hog-tied by paperwork every time we try to accomplish
anything. I understand that for the production programs, the paperwork is necessary.
However, for a priority, short schedule investigation, it makes accomplishment of
our goals in a timely manner extremely difficult, if not impossible. We need the
authority to bypass some of the paper work jungle. As a representative example of
problems and time that could easily be eliminated, consider assembly or disassembly
of test hardware by manufacturing personnel. (See Figure 10)
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Figure 10 October 1, 1985
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The memo in Figure 10 seems to demonstrate the legacy of von Braun’s commitment to
contractor penetration and separation of status, but it also demonstrates how NASA’s
attempts to increase the flow of information actually may have made the situation worse,
leading to structural secrecy that resulted from information simply getting lost in the flow of
paperwork.
The contractors weren’t the only “outside” group von Braun’s team separated
themselves from. Much of the evidence in the Monday Notes also points to a divide between
other entities, such as the military partners, but also within the NASA organization itself. As
Tompkins described, MSFC had a very different philosophy on the use of contractors that
did other centers, especially Johnson Space Center (formerly the Manned Space Center).
The memo shown in Figure 9 shows this difference in philosophy and also demonstrates
some of the ways von Braun’s team became territorial over both the projects they owned and
their place within the larger NASA organization. In this memo, Fellows writes,
It is extremely doubtful if NASA headquarters knows that MSFC is doing this work
for MSC (formerly Manned Space Center, now JSC) and there are no present plans
for informing them. (See Figure 11).
Von Braun then asked if there was a reason why not.
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Figure 11 October 1, 1966

Von Braun’s questioning why they shouldn’t might demonstrate Tompkins’
experience that von Braun wanted to keep the information as open and clear as possible, but
the fact that Fellows thought to write it out might also indicate that the culture of MSFC at
the time suffered from a tendency to want to keep information to themselves, sharing only
with those already on the inside. As I described in earlier in this chapter, the desire to keep
things in house and tendency to point fingers seems evident in this memo (e.g. it’s not MY
organization’s fault; it’s that organization’s fault.). Here, Fellows seems to be making an almost
petty reference to MSC not doing their job, leaving MSFC to pick up the slack. And, in von
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Braun’s questioning of “why not tell NASA?” it seems he wants credit for the work his center
is doing for another center.
Von Braun desire to keep the technical talent in-house seems to stem from both trust
issues with the center’s partners as well as a desire to keep control over as much of the
operations as possible. In Panopticism, Foucault describes a surveillance system so complete
that people are “observed at every point” (198), In his writings about Foucault, Nicolas Rose
picks up on these theories of panopticism, but argues against the notion of an impending
“electronic panopticon,” even as technology more and more could lead to such an “electronic
panopticicon” (245). According to Rose, “it is undoubtedly the case that the introduction of
information technology systems into the workplace has made possible a level of continuous
and molecular surveillance over the activities of individual workers that was logistically
impossible to programmes of scientific management and the era of ‘time and motion’ studies”
(243). However, Rose argues “just because a technology has a potential use, such as that of
surveillance, does not imply that this is the use to which it will be put” (244). I focus my
discussion here on panopticism because Rose’s argument against “electronic panopticism”
because at first glance, the increased paperwork would suggest that a NASA with more
technology (e.g. email capabilities) would naturally lead to a system of more rigorous
surveillance, however these memos suggest that wasn’t the case. Instead, the later advances
in electronic communication led to what Vaughn described as a “blizzard of paperwork” in
which much of the information got lost. In contrast, von Braun seemed to maintain tight
control of his part of the Apollo project through these memos. In Discipline and Punish,
Foucault argued,

73
This enclosed, segmented space, observed at every point, in which the individuals are
inserted in a fixed place, in which the slightest movements are supervised, in which
all events are recorded, in which an uninterrupted work of writing links the centre
and the periphery, in which power is exercised without division, according to a
continuous hierarchical figure, in which each individual is constantly located,
examined and distributed among the other living beings … all this constitutes a
compact model of the disciplinary mechanism. (80).
Von Braun’s desire for control seems evident throughout the memos. The example in Figure
6 shows he was always watching and would notice if he wasn’t receiving information. Even as
his notations made the notes popular with his team, the notations also indicate a leader who
was very involved and wanted his presence felt. His comments were often extensive,
indicating that he didn’t miss much. Compared to the later electronic communications, the
Monday Notes seemed to have allowed von Braun much more control over the operation.
The later electronic communications allowed for more information flow, but also perhaps
too much information flow.
In this Chapter, I looked specifically at the instances where structural secrecy began
to show up in the early days of the organization. In particular, I looked at how the initial
purpose and function of the Monday Notes demonstrates both von Braun’s power, but also
the power and legitimacy they demonstrate about technical communication. Separation of
status and von Braun’s preference for the arsenal concept where evident throughout the
notes, so while the notes were intended to help the team communicate, the culture of the
organization was already getting in the way of the notes ability to do so. That is, under
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Vaughn’s definition, the team was already suffering from structural secrecy because their
practices were feeding into the information being “structurally silenced,” rather than getting
intentionally lost.
NASA’s drift into a normalization of deviance, structural secrecy, and a tendency
toward institutional forgetfulness didn’t happen in a void. How much von Braun’s practices
influenced the whole of NASA, with all of its distinct cultures, may be debatable, but he was
instrumental in the Apollo project and seen as a very effective leader. Von Braun’s group at
MSFC was also operating within the cultural and political climate of the time, which
included strong patriotism and a competitive desire to beat Russia to the moon and the
violence surrounding the civil rights movements and campus unrest. The political climate in
Huntsville and MSFC at the time was further complicated by the recent Nazi past shared by
von Braun and many on his team. The cultural and political climate they found themselves
operating is also evident in the Monday Notes, and might have led to additional points of
silence. In Chapter 4, I explore the silences that demonstrate the cultural and political
influences on the organization. It is these silences surrounding racial integration and the
Apollo 1 accident that von Braun’s team’s shifted or ignored. That is, rather in contrast to
structural secrecy, these silences demonstrate the impact of culture and political imperatives
on communication. As Jones argued, “Acknowledging the social impacts of communication
legitimizes TPC as a field that fully understands, appreciates, and addresses the social
contexts in which it operates” (3). These social impacts play out over and over in our history.
They are easy to see in hindsight and difficult to see in the present.
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CHAPTER 4: CULTURE AND TERROR: PROJECT PAPERCLIP AND APOLLO 1

Building on Tompkins’ and Vaughn’s’ discussions of structural secrecy, opening here
with Kennedy allows me to illustrate the importance of and pressures on NASA engineers.
Kennedy’s dual goals of civil rights and working to get to the moon in that decade
demonstrate the pressures and concerns von Braun and his team would have been facing as
the Monday Notes began to take shape. In this chapter, I examine how these silences were
evident in the Monday Notes, and I argue for their continued importance. Tompkins argued
the Monday Notes worked against hindsight bias by preventing the “masking” of
information. He quotes Weick and Ashford’s argument that “frequent communicating, such
as is represented by the Monday Notes, is one way to prevent such masking.” But, Weick
and Ashford also write, “In hindsight, there appears to be one best way and nothing much to
learn. This conclusion is troublesome because it was arrived at through severe editing out of
complexity and ambiguity present at the time the action originally unfolded” (86). The
concept of hindsight bias is important to my study because both of the areas of silence I
examine, the silence surrounding racial integration and the silence surrounding Apollo 1
continue to be echoed today. So while these silences are not structural, they are critical to the
study of technical communication.
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In 1961, Kennedy announced America would be going to the moon in response to
the Cold War and the space race. In his speech, Kennedy directly addressed some of the
cultural and political imperatives of the time:
Finally, if we are to win the battle that is now going on around the world between
freedom and tyranny, the dramatic achievements in space which occurred in recent
weeks should have made clear to us all, as did Sputnik in 1957, the impact of this
adventure on the minds of men everywhere, who are attempting to make a
determination of which road they should take…Now it is time to take longer
strides—time for a great new American enterprise—time for the nation to take a
clearly leading role in space achievement, which in many ways may hold the key to
our future on earth (Kennedy).
In this speech, Kennedy combines fears that have both personal and social/democratic
implications. “Freedom and tyranny” evoke personal and social emotions. The Cold War
would have left individuals concerned for their safety as well as that of the “free country” that
was America. The successful launch of Sputnik would have invoked feelings of
competitiveness, which Kennedy plays on by suggesting that the launch would have
adventurous men deciding “which road they should take.” Through his speeches, Kennedy
was able to play on the emotions of America and ultimately build a lot of public support for
the space program. Kennedy’s rhetoric spoke to people’s fear of the Cold War and
competiveness at reaching the moon first, but the 60’s also represent a violent time in our
history.
Kennedy was largely successful in his bid to gain public support of the space program
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and all it represented, but Huntsville had its own challenges with cultural and political
norms. The tensions of these cultural imperatives are evidenced in the Monday Notes,
particularly in the silences after the Civil Rights Act of 1964 passed and after the tragic fire
during a test of Apollo 1. These silences do not fit neatly into structural secrecy, but
nevertheless, they represent moments where MSFC’s partners (the community of Huntsville
and the larger community of America and the government) impacted the culture on the
inside of the NASA center. In this chapter, I will describe these tensions and investigate the
ways the Monday Notes spoke to them.
In the next section, I begin this chapter with a discussion of Project Paperclip, the
somewhat secret government operation that led to the rapid immigration of German’s to
American and then Huntsville shortly following WWII. The complexities added to both
MSFC and Huntsville by Project Paperclip allows a fuller narrative the silences surrounding
racial integration and equal rights. I then move the discussion of the silences surrounding
Apollo 1. As I have previously discussed, Tompkins argued the Monday Notes worked to
insure MSFC wasn’t vulnerable to the problems that led to the later disasters, but perhaps
the silence around Apollo 1 allows a competing narrative to emerge. Jones argued,
“legitimizing the experiences and perspectives of others encourages researchers to explore
other ways of learning, knowing, and communicating while reflexively interrogating whom
we seek to empower and by what means we support such empowerment” (15). The cultural
and political imperatives laid out by Kennedy are at times apparent in the notes. And, in
particular, in the section on Apollo 1, the notes demonstrate much of what Tompkins
argued. But, the cultural climate of the U.S. and Huntsville during the time was also evident
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in the notes, and provides a fuller narrative of how the team reacted (or failed to react) to the
times.

Project Paperclip
One of the aspects of the Apollo project that must be included in any discussion of
the time period and any attempt to interpreted its documents is that of the political and
cultural challenges of the time. Early in the 60’s, particularly in 1963, the participants of the
Monday Notes began to focus their attention on equal employment opportunities. Their
discussions become quite involved in some cases, and they discussed recruitment efforts,
educational challenges, and even how to make Huntsville a place where African Americans
would feel comfortable making a life.
Huntsville faced many challenges similar to the rest of the country during the 60’s,
but the town also faced distinct racial tensions driven by the earlier immigration of German
engineers, who were recruited shortly after World War II as part of a government program
named Project Paperclip. Under Project Paperclip, “the scientists, engineers, and technicians
were brought to the United States ‘under limited military custody and surveillance,’ outside
of the formal immigration system” (Laney, loc 588). Laney situated her research into the
integration of German engineers into Huntsville and MSFC at the crossroads between the
immigration of German engineers and Huntsville’s challenges with racial tension in the civil
rights era. She wrote, “The first German families arrived when Jim Crow laws were still a
mainstay of southern culture, with its legacy of slavery and a growing civil rights movement
on the horizon” (loc 284). As the Marshall Space Flight Center grew, “many white residents
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benefited economically from the influx of new jobs and saw a diversification in educational
and cultural choices, [but] African American residents could rarely take advantage of these
opportunities” (Laney, loc 930).
Huntsville was going through a lot of change during this time due to a variety of
factors including civil rights and the “rise of the military-industrial complex and the rise of
the so-called gunbelt during the cold war” (Laney, loc 1042). Laney cites the following
statistics, demonstrating the challenges African Americans had in Huntsville, resulting in
some black families deciding to leave the area:
Huntsville’s African American population declined fro 32 percent (5,250 our of 16,
437) in 1950 to 14 percent (10, 091 out of 72, 365) in 1960 and 12 percent (16,
729) out of 137, 802) in 1970, even as absolute numbers grew. (loc 1071).
Laney further pointed to the space program as attracting “more and more whites to the area
and the discrepancies between whites and blacks were exaggerated by the juxtaposition of
space rocket programs and communities lacking basic necessities” (loc 1097). In 1963,
“NASA suggested the formation of the Association of Huntsville Area Contractors” to aid in
efforts to recruit African Americans into MSFC and Huntsville (Laney, loc 1214).
Von Braun and the German Rocketeers were largely welcomed by the MSFC
community, and instead of fully recognizing their Nazi pasts they instead lauded them and
referred to them as “our Germans.” To illustrate the attitude to von Braun and the German
engineers, Laney provides this account from Ed Buckbee, “a close associate of von Braun’s”
who “described his surprise at a question from a graduate student after he gave a talk about
Wernher von Braun at the University of Alabama in Huntsville in 2006:
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And this one kid asked the question, “How could you work for a Nazi?”…I was
shocked by that question, because… von Braun never…I never envisioned him as a
Nazi…It was just a question I wasn’t prepared for, and I didn’t give him a very good
answer, I don’t think. I wish I had said, “Well, you know, the reason I never thought
of him as a Nazi was because of his leadership skills.” And, that’s, you know, there
was never any question about the man’s ability or his past affiliation, because what he
was doing was …right, was for the country, and we were all working together as a
team, and I never thought of him as a foreigner. And…I think that’s safe to say
about a lot of people like me, American born, who came to work here…It just didn’t
seem like we were working for Germans. (loc 1465)
The elephant in the room, though, was the discrepancy between how the people of
Huntsville and the people of MSFC view the Germans versus how they viewed the African
Americans who didn’t enjoy the same privilege. While Laney described the general town’s
reception to the Germans as “lukewarm” (loc 1573), she also went on to write,
Hunstvillians perceived the German group as not particularly political. This image fit
well with that of the apolitical scientist or engineer, which some of the German
interviewees invoked in a different context to explain why the rocketeers would not
be held responsible for atrocities committed under Hitler’s regime” (loc 1648).
But, the Germans in Huntsville were not necessary vetted through the normal immigration
process, an aspect of Project Paperclip that they government tried to keep under wraps. And,
at the time of the German immigration to Huntsville, the South was still under Jim Crow
laws, leaving the German engineers to use “essentially the same reasoning …to explain their
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lack of intervention and resistance to racial policies under the Nazi regime, some of the
Germans in Huntsville managed to view themselves as innocent bystanders and therefore
absolve themselves from the need to take action against Jim Crow” (Laney, loc 3906).
The culture and racial tensions in place in Huntsville in the 1960’s likely affected the
culture of structural secrecy within the MSFC. While some saw von Braun as a “hero”
during this time, he had recently also built rockets as a Nazi. Nuefeld found evidence to
suggest that von Braun was fundamentally apolitical in temperament, but at school and at
home he was immersed in an environment of right-wing skepticism about parliamentary
democracy” (35). But, my research suggests that rather than being apolitical, von Braun
worked to operate within whichever political climate he found himself part as long as he was
able to continue his research and development of rockets. This discussion of place and
location is important to my discussion of structural secrecy at NASA because it places MSFC,
Huntsville, and von Braun in the place where they actively worked as they created the
communications that became the Monday Notes archive. Within the Monday Notes, the
group did conduct extensive talks about racial integration and workers’ rights, but they
stopped talking about both issues around the time the Civil Rights Act of 1964 passed. Their
fairly sudden silence on the matter suggests that racial integration was not a high priority.
Nuefeld wrote, “In the larger scheme of things, integration was only a passing distraction,
quickly overshadowed” (386). That the group worked under outright secrecy (i.e. the
government’s failure to clearly communicate the exact nature of their immigration) and more
subtle secrecy (i.e. their own refusal to acknowledge their place within the political climate)
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likely influenced how they communicated with each other and with those outside of their
particular work groups.
In addition, critical race scholar, Derrik Bell argued that government leaders at the
time were not particularly forthcoming about the reasons for the apparent advances in civil
rights. In Critical Race Theory, Delgado and Stephancic wrote, “Bell argued that civil rights
advances for blacks always seemed to coincide with changing economic conditions and the
self-interest of elite white” (22), and they observe that shortly after the war, “African
American service members had performed valiantly in the service of democracy. Many of
them returned to the United States, having experienced for the first time in their lives a
setting in which cooperation and survival took precedence over racism” (23). As Laney
argued,
Far more important in the view of many scholars, however, is the influence of World
War II. The blatant contradiction between the country’s opposition to the crimes of
the Third Reich against European Jews and the continued existence of a racial caste
system in the United States was proving embarrassing, severely damaging the nation’s
credibility as leader of the “free world” (35).
Delgado and Stephancic offered a similar interpretation of the motivations behind the push
for progression during this time, writing, “It would ill serve the U.S. interest if the world
press continued to carry stories of lynchings, Klan violence, and racist sheriffs” (23). The
arguments and interpretations from Laney, Bell, and Delgado and Stephancic seem to
indicated yet another layer of silence, as well as a lack of real investment in progression.
Despite the fact that von Braun and his group discussed recruitment fairly extensively in the
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notes, the surrounding narratives beg the question of whether von Braun’s investment came
only or mostly from directives from above.
As I read through the Monday Notes, I kept coming back to the seeming
contradiction of von Braun as a Nazi and von Braun as seemingly an advocate of equal
employment opportunity as my findings in the Monday Notes suggest. This apparent
dichotomy begs the question of how von Braun and the German engineers on his team were
able to move somewhat seamlessly between the two cultures and two countries both facing
monumental challenges with racism. How could von Braun so quickly go from Nazi to
working with area colleges to recruit minorities? In Faces at the Bottom of the Well: The
Permanence of Racism, Bell quoted Kimberle Cremshaw’s argument of race consciousness,
which seems to speak to the German’s attitudes: “[Race consciousness] makes it difficult for
whites ‘to imagine the world differently. It also creates the desire for identification with
privileged elites. “but focusing on a distinct, subordinate ‘other,’ whites include themselves in
the dominant circle—an arena in which most hold no real power, but only their privileged
racial identity” (195).
Through her work, Laney provides narratives of the racial tensions in Huntsville
through interviews with those who witnessed the changes went through after World War II.
Laney wrote
Originally, at the time of the project’s inception in July 1945, the U. S. government’s
goal was the short-term exploitation of the specialists’ expertise. By March 1946, the
government had recognized the importance of denying the Germans’ scientific and
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technical knowledge to other nations and expanding the recruitment of experts from
Germany. (loc 542)
According to Laney, these German engineers were not especially considered trustworthy, at
least not initially, but they still enjoyed greater privilege than did African Americans even
after the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In one of the more comprehensive accounts of von
Braun’s life, Von Braun: Dreamer of Space, Engineer of War, historian Michael J. Nuefeld
attempts to provide a historical account of both the “hero” and “villain” narratives, but the
literature is clear on von Braun’s involvement with the Nazi party and his use of
concentration camp labor to build the V2 rockets used to attack the allies during WWII.
Nuefeld wrote,
[Von Braun] later asserted, regarding the military use of his rocket: ‘But war is war,
and because my country found itself at war, I had the conviction that I did not have
the right to bring further moral viewpoints to bear. My duty was to help win the war,
whether I had any sympathy for the government or not. I did not have any’— a
rather dubious statement before 1944. The ideology that science and technology
were neutral and apolitical, which he had adsorbed from his youth and education,
gave him yet another reason to distance himself from the consequences of his actions;
he was merely supplying his expertise to his government, as he was expected to do”
(161-162).
As I researched von Braun’s background as both a Nazi and a NASA director, I
wanted to approach the archive with a eye toward what his somewhat competing
backgrounds might add to the emerging narrative. In his work, Deadly Documents: Technical
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Communicators, Organizational Discourse, and the Holocaust, Ward expands on Katz’s
examination of memos from the Holocaust and he works to “show how the texts’ rhetorical
plasticity permitted competing SS interests to map their own interpretations on to the
documents, while at the same time marshaling a common fund of rhetorical resources by
which these interests, under the goal of an integrative exigence, negotiated a temporary space
of cooperation” (5). Ward’s work with the narrative and rhetoric of the Nazi memos was of
interest to me because of what they might tell us about the mindset von Braun brought to his
team at NASA. I was particularly interested in what cultural or organizational structures
might be traced back to his past as an SS officer. Ward’s work analyzed the “management
science” side of the organization, and, specifically he posted the question:
What if we leave behind the notion there are autonomous entities called
“organization” and instead see them as temporary clusters of consensus—fitfully
negotiated and constructed through members’ communicative interactions—the
ongoing contest between larger historical, cultural, and social discourses? (3)
Ward’s notion of “fitfully negotiated and constructed” was similar to arguments found in
much NASA scholarship.
Huntsville and von Braun’s team faced somewhat unique challenges during this time
because of Project Paperclip combined with the ending of Jim Crow and the attempted racial
integration that followed. This created an environment of contradictions. These
contradictions and controversies surrounding von Braun have been addressed in many of the
literature I have referenced, but one of the quotes I found most compelling by came from a
1946 documentary, called I Aim at the Stars, in which, satirically von Braun is quoted as
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saying, “I aim at the Stars and sometimes I hit London.” It is here in this contrast and
controversy that I found the references to racial integration so important to any attempt at
finding an emerging narrative within the Monday Notes. According to Nuefeld, “Von
Braun’s natural inclination was to duck, as he was neither notably prejudiced nor particularly
interested in creating trouble for himself by speaking out against prejudice” (386). From the
various biographies I read about von Braun, it seems he was far more interested in just
building his rockets, and much less interested in dealing with the politics that surrounded
him. Nuefeld came to a similar conclusion regarding von Braun’s reaction to using slave
labor to build the rockets for the Nazi’s: “Sometime after 1953, probably in the late 1960’s
or early 1970’s, von Braun told space and science fiction author Arthur C. Clark: ‘I never
knew what was happening in the concentration camps. But, I suspected it, and in my
position I could have found out. I didn’t and I despise myself” (145). We will never know
whether he did or did not actually despise himself over that decision, but by his own
admission he didn’t check. It was due to his seeming ambivalence to the use of concentration
camp labor in WWII that I was surprise to find these extensive conversations about racial
integration and worker’s rights in the Monday Notes. In the next section, I examine a
selection of the Monday Notes in which the team discusses minority recruitment efforts.

Recruitment and Silence
In a memo dated April 9, 1962, I found the first early reference to equal employment
opportunities. This memo, seen in Figure 12, references the President’s Committee on Equal
Employment Opportunities. This memo suggests an imperative from Kennedy to begin to
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make efforts to recruit minorities. The memo involved Michoud, a NASA assembly facility,
and presumably this memo refers to cooperating with the various contractors involved
(Boeing, Chrysler, and Mason-Rust) along with MSFC and Michoud to coordinate hiring
efforts. In this memo, Constan wrote, “There were no problems or any expected in this area
at Michoud,” indicating that those involved expected complying with the President’s
program to be, at least in some sense, seemless (See Figure 12). This memo suggests that not
only was NASA becoming invested in working toward the President’s goals of equal
opportunity, but also that they planned to work closely with their contractors to ensure that
they were also focused on meeting the President’s goals.
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Figure 12 April 9, 1962

The memo shown in Figure 13 builds on the expected cooperation of the contractors. In this
memo, I found the first reference to the Huntsville Contractor’s Equal Opportunity
Committee. The Huntsville Contractor’s Equal Opportunity Committee was created in
1963, and was “chaired by a local white business leader, Milton Cummings, and [the
committee] became the leading force in creating equal employment opportunities for African
Americans through federally funded apprenticeship and training programs” (Laney, loc
1214).
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Figure 13 July 8, 1963

This memo and references to local Marshall contractors seems to indicate that von Braun’s
team intended to be involved in the hiring practices at the contractor sites, much as they
involved themselves with the manufacturing and research and development of the
technology itself. However, what is left out of the memo is also of note. These memos focus
specifically on coordinating with contractors to build equal opportunities, but they do not
provide much information on how NASA or MSFC intended to build the opportunities on
the inside of the organization. According to Nuefeld, “Webb, impelled by Lyndon Johnson’s
concern about the continuing lack of opportunity for African-Americans in Huntsville, sent
von Braun a letter on 24 June 1963 instructing him to apply pressure on local contractors for
more hiring” (386). Figure 13, also shows involvement with contractors’ hiring practices. As
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I discussed earlier, von Braun’s program of contractor penetration, whereby his people were
sent to monitor the contractors, seems very much alive in these memos. He seems prepared
to involve himself and his team in the hiring practices of the contractors they work with. On
one hand, this could indicate an attention to citizenship on his part, but we are still left with
the contradiction of von Braun’s Nazi past (and, the Nazi past of many of the German
engineers working at MSFC at the time). Nuefeld wrote that this tension would lead to “two
years of episodic discomfort for von Braun over the civil rights issue” (386). As Laney
describes in her text, many of the narratives from those who lived in Huntsville at the time
remember a division, a separation between the Whites and the Germans (who looked white
and therefore enjoyed a higher status than did the African Americans) and the African
Americans who suffered from a lack of pretty much everything: resources, education,
entertainment, etc. In Figure 10, they seem to acknowledge some of these challenges with
recruitment in Huntsville in part of a discussion about an agreement with GE:
Do all in their power individually and collectively as NASA contractor to improve
local conditions for negroes so that more colored applicants can be attracted to the
Huntsville area and those who are here will be encouraged to stay (See Figure 14).
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Figure 14 July 15, 1963

Working towards attracting African Americans to Huntsville would have been a difficult task
during this time. Not only were African American’s leaving quite rapidly; the German
immigrants seemed to enjoy a greater level of privilege. NASA administrator, James E. Webb,
“announced in 1964 that NASA and related industries might have to consider moving their
operations to another facility if the racial climate in Huntsville did not improve” (Laney, loc
1214). But, Webb evidently expressed this sentiment much earlier, as is alluded to in Figure
15.
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Figure 15 September 6, 1963

The lack of access to good education was a long standing fight for the minorities they
were trying to recruit. Separate but equal was anything but equal, and the legacy of the Jim
Crow laws persisted. As Laney noted, “Since educational qualification was a key factor in
getting a job in the space industry, however, the locals’ hesitancy to improve educational
opportunities for African American continued to inhibit blacks’ ability to take advantage of
the greater variety of job options now available to them” (loc 1214). Fortune expanded the
discussion on the educational problems, as seen in Figure 16. In this memo, dated 3/2/1964,
he wrote,
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Taylor, [Chairman of the President’s Committee], seemed quite please with all the
colored employees he saw around the construction site, wondered as to NASA and
GE plans along this score as well as what we are doing to improve housing, schools,
and recreational facilities for minority groups in the surrounding areas. We pointed
out that in many cases colored schools had as good rating, sometimes better, than
some of the white schools in the area.

Figure 16 March 2, 1964
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But, Laney reported the opposite from her research:
The Germans not only seemed unsupportive of African American causes, they
appeared to be placing even more obstacles in the way of African American’s progress.
As Smith explained: This is one of the negative things they’ve done—they were [the
ones] who helped found the University of Alabama here in Huntsville. And I say
negative because there was already a state supported school in Huntsville and it’s
called Alabama A&M. And so you now have this clash, this friction, this tension,
between the new white school and the old black school, both state supported. (loc
2694).

Through her research and in her text, Laney paints a picture of extreme tension between
MSFC and the minorities in Huntsville. Even as the memos suggest those at MSFC were
working to create a better environment to attract the minorities, Laney’s research leads me to
the conclusion that even though von Braun and his team seemed to be actively working
toward integrating their workforce, they may have been somewhat blind to how fully
embedded the problem was. Blindness to racial issues is nothing new, and of course we still
face this today. But, the MSFC didn’t operate in a vacuum, and those outside the
community of the MSFC would have affected the operations of the organization itself.
Staggers noted the affect of the community on the organization in her study as well: “There
is a paradox at Hanford: Compartmentalization creates the illusion that there is a compute
rupture between the controlled, surveilled, disciplinary space of the HEW and the
presumably private, normal, free terrain of the private home and civic space of Richland; at
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the same time, the partitioning, surveillance, and ranking of village life replicates the social
order at the plant” (89).
While their efforts and discussions in the memos seemed to indicate a move toward
becoming good citizens within their community, the Monday Notes discussions on Equal
Employment Opportunities, combined with the narrative of Laney, also indicate that
possibly they were working to meet the call of President Kennedy, but not much else. That is,
the President wanted the U.S. to make an effort to provide equal employment opportunities,
but von Braun and his team may have not seen it as a priority as such. One of the more
compelling pieces of evidence that von Braun and his team may have not seen this as a top
priority is what’s missing from the Monday Notes archive: a continued discussion about
minority recruitment. As the memos I’ve included show, von Braun and his team conducted
extensive discussions about racial integration in the Monday Notes, most particularly during
1963, but after the Civil Rights Act of 1964 passed, they stopped discussing the challenges
surrounding racial integration in the Monday Notes altogether. The subjects of racial
integration, equal employment opportunities, and the problems Huntsville faced simply
stopped being mentioned by the team. It’s possible they still discussed these issues in other
contexts, but its absence could indicate they felt that when the Civil Rights Act passed, the
problem had been solved. The absence of continued conversation regarding racial integration
also strengthens the argument that von Braun was more interested in rockets than politics or
people. Kennedy had declared we would get to the moon that decade, and that seemed to be
von Braun’s biggest priority at the time. Kennedy pushed for minority recruitment, but he
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also pushed the race to the moon. As I describe in the next section, the push to get to the
moon likely led to silence surrounding Apollo 1.

Apollo 1
Given the field’s interest in both the Challenger and Columbia disasters, I was
naturally interested in what the notes might tell us about the communications surrounding
Apollo 1. Instead of looking for and likely stretching to identify an early scenario that
matched neatly with the Challenger and Columbia narratives, as I approach the year of the
accident, I continued to try and let the narrative emerge on their own. In my first pass
through the archive, I tried to take the memos in as a whole, rather than in parts. As Glenn
and Enoch noted, “Rarely do researchers identify an archive and hope to find a research
project in it. Instead they begin with a broad research questions and then read widely and
deeply until they begin to identify an outline of significance or basis of investigation for the
project at hand” (13). But, as I read through the archive, I realized I had inadvertently passed
the time of the accident, and I had to retrace my steps. I had missed it because in contrast to
some of the earlier memos, von Braun and his team became much more technical and distant
in their discussions of the fire. In this section, I analyze the silence surrounding the fatal fire
of Apollo 1 that killed astronauts.

Cultural and Political Imperatives
In the 60’s NASA was a new organization working to meet the challenges set by
Kennedy to get man to the moon in that decade, but those working on the project had never
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done anything like it before. They were working out how to do the work in the 60’s, and the
memos show the day-to-day interactions between a specific group of people, but what do
they show about the other dimensions of the project? As Vaughn wrote after the Challenger
accident, NASA’s cultural imperatives at the time of the Challenger disaster were driven
primarily by political accountability, bureaucratic accountability, and the standards of the
original technical culture. Those working on the Apollo project had the same imperatives,
and in addition, those working on Apollo had to learn everything at once. It was a new
project. In von Braun’s biography, Neufeld writes of the enormity of the task Kennedy put
before them. In his speech to Congress, Kennedy said:
First, I believe this Nation should commit itself to achieving the goal, before this
decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to the earth.
No single space project in this period will be more exciting, or more impressive to
mankind, or more important for the long-range exploration of space, and none will
be so difficult or expensive to accomplish. (364).
Nuefeld described the mood at Marshall after the speech as filled with “joyous cries of ‘Yeah!’
and “Let’s go!’” (364). He wrote von Braun got right to work and “unleashed a blizzard of
studies to plan for Nova and Saturn C-3, the launch site, and the production plant, even as
all assumptions were thrown into the air” (364). To demonstrate the enormity of the task
given to von Braun’s group, he quotes this letter from von Braun to his father, “Ever since
Kennedy declared his intent to go to the Moon, all hell has broken loose here. At the
moment, we are working on plans which put the shade in everything we have done before
and against which even our ‘Saturn’ [C-1] pales” (364-65). The cultural imperatives
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described by Vaughn in the Challenger project were clearly also in play during the Apollo
project. During this process of working to get man to the moon, von Braun and his team
had to work to legitimate the knowledge as it came in. The Challenger and Columbia
accidents show clear bias toward civil servant knowledge and deference to hierarchy. In
beginning work on Apollo, von Braun also showed a preference for the knowledge of civil
servants, particularly his own civil servants. As Longo argues, “This question of how one
group’s discourse became knowledge within a historically situated culture while another
group’s discourse was not seen as knowledge strikes at the heart of current discussions of
multiculturalism, gender issues, conflict, ethics, community, and postmodernism” (19).
To demonstrate the differences in how von Braun’s team reacted to the idea of
“audience” before and after Apollo 1, here I provide a brief tracing of some of the earlier
memo’s informalities and conversational style. The previous investigations of the Monday
Notes using the meta-notes and partner tensions demonstrate some of the ways structural
secrecy was in some sense built into the organization and allowed to take hold. But, further
examples from the Monday Notes indicate that despite von Braun’s desire for open
communication, the team already knew they were operating in a culture that dictated
communication be kept on the “inside” of the organization. I found several indications of
this “inside” cultural though out the Monday Notes, as the example in the meta-Notes
section showed.
As I described in the meta-notes section, the notes were intended to be informal, and
the notes varied wildly from extremely technical to very personal and/or humorous. The
example in Figure 17 shows some of this informality and what seems to be an expectation
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that the notes would be kept in house. In this example, von Braun notes that his wife has
read a book recommended in the text of the Monday Note. This informality is consistent
with what Tompkins found, and likely led, in part, to the popularity of the Monday Notes
among von Braun’s team. The Monday Notes likely led to a sense among the team that they
were valued, and von Braun’s willingness to communicate in a more informal manner likely
strengthened this sense among his key members. While the informality shows von Braun was
likely aware of his internal audience, the informal nature of the notes could also be
interpreted as a sign that he felt they would be primary restricted to an internal audience,
which was not the case in the end.

Figure 17 Sideline Comment/Informality

Citing Bernard, Tompkins argued informal systems of communication “is necessary
to effective formal communication” (75). Tompkins wrote, “The first indispensable function,
said Barnard, is communication: the formal channels of communication can’t begin to
handle all the coordination that needs to be done” (75). Using an informal style of
communication in the Monday Notes likely led the team to feel more comfortable sharing
bad news with von Braun, which likely did help the team guard against problems with
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structural secrecy. As Tompkins observed, “this gave them the confidence to raise red flags
about technical problems the formal system hadn’t discovered” (75).
The Monday Notes contain multiple examples of raising red flags, but in the early
days, they seem to be writing the notes with the expectation that the information would stay
with the team. Later notes, however, show a shift in and they begin to demonstrate an
awareness of an outside audience. The attention to audience, which in reality, involved both
that of an “inside” and an “outside” audience becomes more apparent through the team’s
discussions of various accidents, injuries, and, in particular, fatalities. NASA has always
worked with risky, unruly technology, and accidents happened. In Figure 18, a memo
references the fatality of an employee of Wylie Laboratories. In this earlier memo, von Braun
seems somewhat unclear on the process of reporting the accident and he comments, “I think
we are expected to report this accident to Washington.” The memo also contains a reference
to the detailed information about the accident being for von Braun only, which he then
requests to be sent on to Gormon. This reference to von Braun only could be an indication
of structural secrecy, but it could just as easily be because the detailed information wasn’t
relevant to the rest of the team.
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Figure 18 Fatal Accident

In a memo dated 1/29/62, Gormon references another accident, and in this memo,
they mention the injured by name. The memo (in Figure 19) indicates the accident
happened after hours, but the victim, Mr. Fowler was driving a contracted vehicle. The
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memo then references possible legal problems. In this example, they seem to be mostly
considering an internal audience, but in comparison to the Apollo 1 accident, this one seems
fairly minor. The mention of legal problems may also be a note to bring in legal experts. In
the next example, a memo written shortly after the Apollo 1 fire, however, the team seems to
shift to a more distant tone. This distancing can be seem in the first memos following the fire,
as well as in all of the memos that follow.

Figure 19 January 29, 1962
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In Figure 20, dated 1/30/1967, I found the first reference to Apollo 1 following the
fire on the launch pad that killed three astronauts. The date is three days after the accident, a
delay I attribute to the weekly nature of the Monday Notes. Because this was a fatality
accident, it is likely the team had meetings to discuss how to handle the accident outside of
the Monday Notes. This accident differs from the project’s previous accidents in that the
notes do not mention the name of the astronauts or even Apollo 1, instead the team reverts
to referring only to the flight number, which is AS-204 (See Figure 20).

Figure 20 Apollo 1
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The Monday Notes continue to discuss the accident and document how to move
forward with testing and the project, but they never mention the astronauts’ names or refer
to the mission as Apollo 1. The change from mentioning specifics and names seems to
indicate von Braun and his team were aware that with the accident on the launch pad, their
communications surrounding the project were no longer going to be read by an internal
audience. Instead the Monday Notes would be used to help in the investigation, leading von
Braun and his team to revert to a more technical tone in the memos (at last as far as the
discussion of the accident was concerned). I do not mean to imply, in this discussion, any
fault or blame on the part of von Braun and his team. Rather, just to note the difference in
tone from the earlier memos.
Tompkins doesn’t spend much time discussion AS-204 (Apollo 1), an omission I
found notable. In his earlier work Organizational Communication Imperatives: Lessons of the
Space Program, he wrote, “The contractor’s management [specific contractor not named by
Tompkins], by the way, was reportedly well know for discouraging the upward flow of bad
news, and earlier its top managers had apparently been forced out after the Apollo 204 fire”
(70). From this quote, it seems Tompkins believed the contractors were mostly to blame for
the fire, and both the Monday Notes and previous scholarship point to many, many
moments of contractor and partner tensions. In the narratives surrounding the Monday
Notes, these partner and contractor tensions seem to hold a key role. In Nuefeld wrote, “Von
Braun administered a center budget that nearly tripled to a billion dollars per year by FY
1963—most of it going to the stage and engine contracts with North American, Boeing,
Douglas, and Chrysler” (382). And, further, “MSFC peaked in 1966 at 7,740 civil servants,
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over 20 percent of NASA, plus about fifteen thousand contractors” (382). The high number
of contractors indicates a lot of moving parts, and a lot of places where information could get
lost. In addition, von Braun was engaged in somewhat tense relations with NASA
administrators, as previously discussed in Chapter 3. Von Braun wanted to operate under the
arsenal concept, but NASA wanted to follow the Air Force’s concept.
The disagreement between how MSFC should be run created tensions with many
partners including (among others): James Webb (NASA’s administrator), George Mueller
(Associate Administrator of the Office of Manned Space Flight), and Robert Seaman’s
(NASA’s Deputy Administrator). By 1962, the Apollo project started to run into major
budget problems, and “By the summer of 1963 human spaceflight was already projected to
be $600 million over budget” (382-84). All of this led to a decision that echoes the decision
to award Thiokol the O-ring contract years later: “Storm’s division of North American had
won the Apollo CSM contract in a controversial award just a couple of months after getting
the S-II contract in the fall of 1961. That meant a huge expansion of employment for NAA,
mostly in southern California, with the consequence that a lot of people were hired with
inadequate experience for the job, with ripple effects on the S-II project” (384). This
contract ultimately resulted in “big cost overruns, delays, and bad management in the
construction of Storm’s S-II assembly plant” (385). In 1965, Sam Phillips “gathered together
all of the reports [of the problems with the S-II] and wrote a cover memo to George Mueller,
later know as the “Phillips Report,” that indicated almost zero confidence in North
American” (398). These problems led to Marshall’s Deputy Director for Technical and
Scientific Matters, Eberhard Rees, to write to von Bruan, “’It is not entirely impossible that
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the first manned lunar landing may slip out of this decade,’ because of the S-II” (398). These
contractor and partner tensions sound strikingly similar to later tensions surrounding the
Challenger and Columbia accidents. Nuefeld description of the aftermath of the fire ties
many of these issues to the accident:
The fire set off the biggest crisis in NASA history, at least until the Space Shuttle
Challenger accident nineteen years later. It forced a massive overhaul of the Apollo
program, delaying the first manned launch until late 1968, although that was
certainly not the expectation immediately afterward. But that was before NASA’s
leadership grasped how problem-plagued the Apollo spacecraft was. The space agency
was allowed to investigate itself, as it was not in the two later shuttle accidents, but
the fire inevitably attracted a lot of intrusive media and congressional attention,
exposing how trouble the North American contract had been, both for the S-II and
for the CSM. When Senator Walter Mondale ambushed Webb with a leaked copy of
the December 1965 “Phillips Report” a few weeks afterward, it had far reaching
effects. Webb never trusted Seamans or Mueller again, feeling that they had hidden
the true dimensions of the North American problem from him” (416).
While this description of the incident describes a more internal audience of the “space
program,” the Monday Notes were more internal to Marshall specifically. The distancing in
the memos surrounding Apollo 1 seem to demonstrate an awareness that the team would
have to address and answer to the factors leading to the accident. Webb’s suspicion that
Seaman and Muellar had hidden contractor problems from him shows cracks in the
communication system at NASA as a whole. So while the Monday Notes may have been
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somewhat successful in guarding against structural secrecy at Marshall, NASA was bigger
than just the MSFC. And, it seems the other centers may not have been enjoying the same
success in regards to communication.
As I wrote at the beginning of Chapter 3, the Monday Notes functioned similarly to
the way Tompkins described them. They show a team dedicated to the success of their
project, and they show a team open to flexibility in getting the rockets off the ground. The
meta-notes, partner tensions, and audience awareness are all elements that Tompkins
mentioned as helping the team progress successfully through the process of working to get
man to the moon. On the other hand, the notes themselves show the cracks in the
communications system from the beginning: the meta-notes explicitly reference excluding
certain members, the partner tensions are very reminiscent of the later tensions with NASA
contractors, and the audience awareness demonstrates their navigation between internal and
external audience awareness, which suggests the team was conscious of the communications
decisions they were making, at least on some level.
Kennedy’s political imperatives of the time, civil rights, the Cold War, and
competition with Russia to get to the moon impacted von Braun’s team as the memos and
surrounding literature demonstrate. While the silences discussed in this chapter don’t fit
under a strict definition of structural secrecy, they do demonstrate how the imperatives
surrounding a workgroup can affect the communication and legitimacy of that
communication. My intention is not to assign blame to von Braun or his team. As I
discussed earlier, he is frequently referred to as a “hero” or “villain,” but we can never fully
know which. Rather, my project seeks to illuminate where structural secrecy was already
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beginning, despite literature and studies that suggest it wasn’t there during Apollo. Vaughn
described structural secrecy as systematic. As such, structural secrecy is difficult to see in the
present moment, but much easier to see in hindsight. To that end, my study pairs Tompkins
narrative with the evidence in the notes to demonstrate how it was already taking root, even
as the Monday Notes and the communicative practices may have still be more effective than
the communicative practices that evolved prior to 1986 and 2003. Further, I moved past the
strict definition of structural secrecy in my discussions on civil rights and Apollo 1 because,
among many things, Kennedy’s imperative, the pasts of the German engineers, the culture of
the city of Huntsville and the south during the 60’s all came together to impact the way von
Braun’s team operated.
Vaughn argued structural secrecy is a phenomenon that impacts all organizations to a
degree, and in this chapter, my discussion has centered on how these other silences also
impact organizations. Communities and political and cultural imperatives that surround
them impact these silences, as well. As a field, TPC continues to work toward identifying the
impact of the silences and the significance of whose voices get heard and whose get lost. In
Chapter 5, I conclude with a discussion of the continued importance the silence have to the
power and legitimacy of the field of TPC.
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CHAPTER 5: SILENCE, POWER, AND LEGITIMACY

At the beginning of this project, I was interested in learning what the Monday Notes
might tell us about how NASA became so vulnerable to the structural secrecy described by
Vaughn and Tompkins. In my examination of the Monday Notes, I found places that
demonstrated possible early roots of structural secrecy at MSFC. MSFC is only one part of
NASA, but in the notes, I found communication breakdowns similar to those found in the
later shuttle disasters. I also found places of silence that indicated how von Braun and his
team worked with and reacted to those outside the center. I began this project concerned
with power and legitimacy, both how they play out in workplace communications and how
they speak to the power and legitimacy we hold as a field of technical and professional
communicators.
NASA provides professional communication scholars with a rich research site in
which to study communicative practices over a period of almost four decades, but, as this
trace demonstrates, we are left without satisfactory answers. Culture often dictates the
communicative practices and power relations of those employed by or connected to an
organization. But, organizations aren’t static and, therefore, neither are workplace cultures.
Cultures shift due to changes in technology, changes in political context, and even with
changes in the very workforce in an organization. An organization that historically has
operated as both a modular work space, as well as a distributed workspace, NASA
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demonstrates the impact technology can have on communicative practices, which can lead to
a shift in power relations and even a shift in the very core culture of an organization. As
Vaughn argues, “The effect of unacknowledged and invisible social forces on information,
interpretation, knowledge, and –ultimately—action, are very difficult to identify and
control”(416). Many technical communication scholars have studied the impact of culture
and silence in organizations, but as Thralls and Blyler note, “researchers in professional
communication have paid more attention to the slow accretion of knowledge through
interaction than they have to radical changes or shifts in a community’s beliefs” (129).
Similarly, Slack et al write, “it is remarkable how little most of us understand the relationship
between power, knowledge, and organization” (173). Professional communication scholars
will, of course, continue to work to understand these relationships, but considering the
nuanced effects of shifts including the loss of voices in an organization and structural secrecy
can help us begin to move toward understanding how these “invisible social forces” affect the
culture of an organization and can greatly affect outcomes. As Foucault argues “It is not
enough, however, to repeat the empty affirmation that the author has disappeared”(105).
Instead, as NASA’s shifting communicative processes show, we need to find more than just
how or why, but how to get those silenced voices back.
Although the archive is more than fifty years old, organizations still struggle with
many of these communication challenges. Themes of missed communication show up time
and time again in both organizations and in technical communication scholarship. In
PowerPoint Does Rocket Science: Assessing the Quality and Credibility of Technical Reports,
Tufte analyzed the PowerPoints used to aid in the decision making process once NASA
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became aware of a problem with Columbia. In this work, Tufte argues that PowerPoints are
an inappropriate medium for transferring technical information, and he argues, “Serious
problems require a serious tool: written reports.” Tufte’s argument is compelling, but his
argument is focused on the medium, and as Dombrowski argues, “There are many other
dimensions to the disaster [beyond the scope of his article], (e.g. political and economic
pressures, outsourcing maintenance, debris from a bolt catcher, and wind shear)” (310). In
his article, The Evolving Face of Ethics in Technical and Professional Communication:
Challenger to Columbia, Dombrowski writes, “[the emergence of ethics] displaces the focus
from the clarity and correctness found in earlier studies to a wider focus on complex, critical
theories of language, ethics, and culture” (307). The structural secrecy and silences I
examined in this archive from the 60’s and the themes traced above still play out in many
organizations today.
From my own experiences in industry, I can fully imagine a “Friday Notes” scenario
playing out in which a manager gets together with her direct reports to decide what
information to send up the ladder. In that process some information is inevitably lost. The
lost information may or may not be important or urgent, but it is still lost. In a larger
cultural sense, many of the more deliberate silences continue to play out today in our
partners, in industry, and even in our own field. In her recent article, Jones argued, “To be
humanistic is to, as emphasized by Miller (1979), understand that technical communication
is not neutral or objective. Instead, technical communication is political and imbued with
values. Technical communication reflects certain perspectives, viewpoints, and
epistemologies. As such, technical communication must be aware of the ways that the texts
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and technologies that they create and critique reinforce certain ideologies and question how
communication shaped by certain ideologies affect individuals” (4). The power and
legitimacy of those creating the texts or participating in the communicative practices is
sometimes evident, sometimes not. And, even when we work to root out the information or
create practices to make sure information doesn’t get lost, it’s still hard to get at the actual
“truth.” The difficultly of getting at the “truth” is particularly evident in the narrative
surrounding von Braun and his life. As I wrote, most literature and scholarship is biased
either to “hero” or “villain.” I chose to pull most of the story of von Braun from Neufeld’s
Von Braun: Dreamer of Space/ Engineer of War because Neufeld presents the most
comprehensive and seemingly balanced view. But, even with Neufeld’s attempt at balance, I
found parts to be perhaps too generous to von Braun. I was surprised then to find many
reviews on Amazon suggesting Neufeld was far too critical.
Similarly, it can be hard to get at the “truth” of how NASA as an organization
reacted to (and continues to react to) equal employment. The special issues of JBTC includes
Miriam F. Williams’ article Reimagining NASA: A Cultural and Visual Analysis of the U.S.
Space Program. In this article, Williams relays the story of an interview she conducted with
Charles Criner, “one of at least three African-American artists hired by NASA in the late
1960s to help draw the flight plan for Apollo 11” (375). In this interview, Criner described
how he got his first job after graduating from “Texas Southern University, a historically
black university in Houston, Texas” (376). Criner relates going in for an interview at an
unnamed company, and while he was waiting in the waiting room, a white candidate came
in to interview (376). The white candidate was granted the first interview, and Criner
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overheard the interviewers telling the white candidate that they had already looked at
Criner’s work and were prepared to hire the white candidate instead. (376). They had not
actually looked at Criner’s work, but Criner got the job anyway because the white candidate
turned it down due to too low of a salary (376). Williams uses this anecdote to illustrate just
how diverse NASA was compared to private industry, and she wrote, “I wonder how NASA
was able to form an ethnically diverse group of artists, engineers, and technical writers in
1969 whereas some organizations continue to struggle with workplace diversity in 2012”
(387). In this article, Williams does acknowledge that she has always held a somewhat rosy
view of NASA because she was part of an “internship program created to encourage minority
students to consider government and technical careers” in 1987 (369). I’m not suggesting
that this praise of NASA is unwarranted, as I also tend to view NASA with rose-colored
glasses.
In contrast to Williams’ rosy view of the diversity of NASA in the 60s, Neil deGrasse
Tyson had a very different perception. In his book, Space Chronicles: Facing the Ultimate
Frontier, Tyson wrote a letter to NASA describing his lifelong fascination with NASA and
space travel (66). In this letter Tyson acknowledges that he would have been too young to go
to the moon, but he also says, “But I also knew my skin color was much too dark for you to
picture me as part of this epic adventure” (66). Tyson would be unlikely to agree with
Williams’ assessment that NASA was able to achieve a more diverse workforce than private
industry, at least he would be unlikely to agree that NASA did it willingly. In his letter,
Tyson goes on to say, “In fact, it took a directive from Vice President Johnson in 1963 to
force you to hire black engineers at your prestigious Marshall Space Flight Center in
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Huntsville, Alabama” (66). Tyson references correspondence between the head of NASA,
James Webb and MSFC’s administrator, Wernher von Braun, which “boldly and bluntly
directs von Braun to address the ‘lack of equal employment opportunity of Negroes’ in the
region, and to collaborate with the region’s colleges Alabama A&M and Tuskegee to
identify, train, and recruit qualified Negro engineers in the NASA Huntsville family” (66).
He later admonishes NASA by saying, “But you should nonetheless know that among my
colleagues, I am the only one in my generation who became an astrophysicist in spite of your
achievements in space rather than because of them” (67). Just as I want to be careful not to
incorrectly interpret Williams’ and Criner’s experiences, I want to be clear here and note that
Tyson, while critical of the early era of NASA, has worked closely with them for many years,
and he ends his note to them with this: “Birthday buddy, even if I have not always been, I
am now your humble servant” (68). With this letter, Tyson acknowledges the strong impact
NASA has had on his life, while at the same time refusing to sweep their early questionable
activities under the rug.
In the competing narrative of von Braun as hero or villain and the competing
narratives of Williams, Tyson, and those presented in Laney’s work, the structural secrecy
and silences found in the Monday Notes begin to provide evidence of the power and
legitimacy of TPC. That is, the truth is not always in the text. The truth is not always in the
historical narratives surrounding the next. In fact, we may never get at the real “truth.” But,
we can learn to recognize the silences and work toward using the triangulation of the sources
to interpret the meaning and importance of what was left out. I do not doubt the Monday
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Notes functioned as a superior communication system to the ones later used at NASA, but
still we can learn from the early cracks.
In their article, St. Aman and Meloncon argued, “concepts important to the group
cannot be seen as the isolated opinion of one person, nor can they be perceived as the unique
perspective of a few individuals” (2). In this article, they argue for “commonality” in the
field, writing, “commonality brings not only legitimacy but also power” (2). They argue for
finding common threads in the field in order for TPC to be ability to demonstrate our power
and legitimacy to those outside the field. The article, Addressing the Incommensurable: A
Research Based Perspective for Considering Issues of Power and Legitimacy in the Field, is the
introduction to the Journal of Technical Writing and Communication that also includes
Jone’s article, The Technical Communicator as Advocate: Integrating a Social Justice Approach
in Technical Communication. St. Amant and Meloncon wrote, Jones “makes her mark as a
researcher in the tradition of Blyler and Thralls (and others) by bringing issues of social
justice increasingly to the forefront of research in TPC” (11). In Jones’ work, and in the
increasing focus on social justice issues in TPC is where I see our power and legitimacy, even
more so than seeing it as tied to commonality in the field. The power and legitimacy comes
from moving research to sites and situations that might have not yet been fully investigated,
but nevertheless offer the field the means by which to demonstrate our on power and
legitimacy through continuing Miller’s humanistic approach.
The power and legitimacy of the field of technical and professional communication,
in some sense, is rooted in our ability to recognize where values, ideologies, and cultures
reveal themselves in our work. Structural secrecy and silence are one small way for TPC to
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demonstrate that value. As Rude argued, “many critiques focus on national and international
catastrophes, such at the Challenger explosion, and the drama of the situation itself may
overwhelm the recommendations for changing practice in ordinary circumstances” (124).
The Monday Notes allowed me to step back from the drama to consider the voices of the
past.
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